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Taiwan: Coronavirus as a Catalyst for Self-Determination

Phuong Hoang and Janice Hinton

Taiwan's success in containing coronavirus infections—with only 77 domestic cases out of 942 total and 9 deaths as of February 22, 2021—gives Taipei a rare opportunity to showcase its leadership in biotech and cybersecurity, push for greater inclusion in multilateral organizations, and establish itself as a sovereign entity separate from mainland China. Citizens' record-high identification as Taiwanese instead of Chinese and their strong public support for President Tsai suggest she has a mandate for pursuing further sovereignty. These ripening conditions for independence have prompted Beijing to up overt threats against Taipei, making consistent U.S. support for Taiwan's integration into the global community critical to the island's pursuit of autonomy.

Taiwan's Remarkable COVID-19 Success

After Taiwan's first confirmed case of COVID-19 in January 2020, researchers at Johns Hopkins University predicted the island, given its close ties to China, would have the second largest outbreak outside mainland China.¹ Yet Taiwan has been among the most successful at mitigating the pandemic, with 942 cases as of February 22, 2021,² and one of the lowest per capita death rates in East Asia (Figure 1). Taiwan did not have severe summer or winter outbreaks.³ With its science-based approach, transparent communication, and lessons learned from the 2003 SARS outbreak (see Appendix), Taiwan nearly eliminated local spread of the virus—92 percent of confirmed cases occurred in arrivals from abroad.^{4, 5, 6}

Consequently, Taipei offers a Sino-cultural model of pandemic mitigation by a transparent democratic government,⁷ countering Beijing's model of authoritarian containment.⁸


A Rare Opportunity for Taiwan

The World Health Organization's (WHO)^{9, 10} and U.S. officials^{11, 12} praise for Taiwan's COVID-19 success creates a unique opportunity to establish the island as a sovereign entity and perhaps ripen conditions for independence. President Tsai Ing-wen's strong standing and record-high citizen identification as Taiwanese also provide a public mandate for strengthened sovereignty. Although the steady growth of Taiwanese national identity and civic nationalism through democratization has solidified Taiwan's de facto status as a nation state, Beijing's "One China" policy impedes de jure recognition and independence (see Appendix); this section lays out ways in which Taiwan—with democratic partners' support—can challenge this barrier.

Economic Opportunities. Pandemic mitigation and thriving high-tech exports have allowed Taiwan's economy to grow more rapidly than mainland China's for the first time in 30 years.¹³ Taipei's coronavirus response reflects the same government-private sector partnership and innovative application of advanced technology that have propelled its decades-long economic success, suggesting it could use the crisis to pursue economic opportunities, particularly in health security, that would give it greater entrée into international organizations.¹⁴

- **Vaccines, biotechnology, and personal protective equipment:** Tsai plans to make Taiwan's biotech industry—whose revenues grew 9 percent in 2019—a strategic development area.¹⁵

Figure 1. COVID-19 Deaths per 1 Million People (as of February 22, 2021)




Source: Worldometers, COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic, February 22, 2021, <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/>

Three Taiwanese vaccines—one developed with the U.S. National Institutes of Health—have garnered interest from international buyers.^{16, 17} A safe, effective vaccine would boost Taiwan as a global biotechnology player able to conduct vaccine diplomacy with low-income countries wary of China’s vaccines.¹⁸ After new SARS-CoV-2 variants emerged, Taiwan’s Academia Sinica launched a global real-time monitoring network to track new strains and assess vaccine efficiency.¹⁹ Taiwan can produce 25 million face masks daily—the most after China²⁰—making the island a potential major source of personal protective equipment.²¹ Its pledge to donate 10 million masks to other countries²² could facilitate economic cooperation.

- Artificial intelligence (AI) and big data analytics:** The need for contact-free labor has accelerated automation and robotics development.²³ Taiwan’s top ranking in the Global Open Data Index²⁴ makes it an attractive AI and big data market. At the pandemic’s onset, Taiwan integrated its national health insurance database with its immigration and customs database, using travel history and symptoms to identify potential COVID-19 cases.²⁵ Researchers in Taiwan have used AI to diagnose chest X-rays of suspected COVID-19 patients.²⁶ Expanding AI and big data analytics in the health industry—likely to grow rapidly due to the pandemic, aging global population, and technology advancements²⁷—could improve success rates of clinical trials.²⁸
- Cybersecurity and data protection:** Taiwan has mitigated COVID-19-related cyberattacks on its hospitals and home Internet networks, and attempted attacks on healthcare facilities.²⁹ Its willingness to share cybersecurity intelligence³⁰ could establish it as a leader in cybersecurity, especially if businesses decide Taiwan can protect their data better than China. Taiwan was among the first to ban official use of Zoom because of concerns the company routes data through China.³¹ Taiwan adheres to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation privacy and data transfer rules, and it could expand its cybersecurity, AI, and global supply chains credentials if the EU ruled Taiwan meets EU data protection requirements.³²
- Global supply chain stature:** The pandemic has highlighted the risk of relying on a single producer country, and Taiwan has joined U.S. calls for countries to diversify supply chains

Figure 2. Daily COVID-19 Cases in Taiwan (as of February 22, 2021)
Click on Figure 2 to go to an enlarged graph on page 19.



Source: Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University, *COVID-19 Data Repository*, February 22, 2021

to lessen reliance on China.³³ Taiwan would gain from a supply chain shift because of its high standards on Internet protocol and trade secrets security. Tsai has promised to make Taiwan the leading semiconductor supplier³⁴ and to strengthen high-end manufacturing and green energy.³⁵ Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. has stopped making chips for Huawei's 5G phones to comply with U.S. export regulations,³⁶ and major Apple supplier Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. (Foxconn) plans to increase production outside China.³⁷

- ***New Southbound Policy (NSP)***: Pandemic success is likely to enable Taiwan to promote greater economic collaboration and cultural exchange in trade, technology, agriculture, medicine, education, and tourism with the 18 Indo-Pacific countries³⁸ within its NSP. Pandemic lockdowns tempered NSP trade and investment in 2020,³⁹ but Taipei's health collaboration⁴⁰ and "face mask diplomacy"⁴¹ offer paths to up engagement. In November Taiwan established a legislative friendship group with ASEAN members to enhance ties.⁴²
- ***Free trade agreements (FTAs)***: After Taipei eased restrictions on U.S. beef and pork in August,⁴³ 50 U.S. senators called for a bilateral trade accord.⁴⁴ Taiwan's exclusion from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, with China the largest member, probably will prompt renewed pleas to the United States and Japan to support including Taiwan in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).⁴⁵ Taipei could use "face mask diplomacy" and pandemic success to pursue FTAs with Australia,⁴⁶ India,⁴⁷ the EU,⁴⁸ and others seeking to lessen economic reliance on China.

Political Opportunities. Tsai has called 2020 "a generational opportunity" to promote multilateral cooperation⁴⁹ given widespread anger at China's coronavirus handling and aggressive foreign policy—including imposing the National Security Act on Hong Kong and officials' bullying of European counterparts.^{50, 51} By the time the World Health Assembly (WHA) met in May, 63 countries were calling for an independent inquiry into COVID-19's origins.⁵² On the day of the EU-China leadership summit in mid-September,⁵³ nine European experts on China published a call for the EU to change its policy toward Taiwan and China.⁵⁴

- ***WHO/WHA Inclusion:*** Since Belize's call in May for Taiwan to reclaim WHO observer status,⁵⁵ the number of officials supporting Taipei's inclusion has more than doubled to 1,700 in 80 countries.⁵⁶ Australia,⁵⁷ Britain, Canada,⁵⁸ Japan,⁵⁹ New Zealand,⁶⁰ and the United States⁶¹ are on board; Taipei could add more if it shared lessons learned with members. Over 600 European parliamentarians signed a letter supporting Taiwan as a WHA participant.⁶²
- ***International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)***: Sharing how Taipei screens air travelers and other pandemic lessons might persuade the ICAO in July to select a leader more favorable to Taiwan to replace the current head, who is Chinese.⁶³ After Italy and Vietnam banned Taiwanese air carriers in early 2020 because the WHO lists Taiwan as part of China,⁶⁴ Taipei asked for access to ICAO information to preserve aviation safety over the island,⁶⁵ began to visually differentiate its passports from China's, and may change the name of state-run China Airlines.⁶⁶ In April 2019 G7 foreign ministers called for "the substantive participation of all active members of the international aviation community in ICAO forums" because exclusion "compromises aviation safety and security."⁶⁷

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- **Other international organizations:** Participation in the UN-affiliated ICAO could provide Taiwan a steppingstone into the UN General Assembly; China replaced it in 1971. In arguing for inclusion, Taipei cites international praise for its pandemic response,⁶⁸ its global COVID-19 aid, and the UN’s call for multilateralism during the pandemic.⁶⁹ At the 2020 UNGA, the COVID-19 Commission of *The Lancet*, an independent medical journal, urged “nations and regional groupings to put aside rivalries” to promote global recovery and ranked Taiwan as first in suppressing COVID-19 transmission.⁷⁰ Eswatini’s prime minister called for Taiwan’s inclusion, citing its contributions to UN development efforts.⁷¹
 - **Leading health/humanitarian efforts:** Taipei has undertaken soft power actions⁷²—donating 51 million face masks to more than 80 countries^{73, 74} and launching an online health outreach program #TaiwanCanHelp.⁷⁵ Extending health security aid to participants in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and sharing pandemic insights through participation in issue-specific global and regional forums could engender more global goodwill.
 - **Promoting digital activism:** Taiwan’s use of information technology to mitigate COVID-19 spread and facilitate mask distribution highlights differences with China that may encourage major democracies to support Taiwan more vocally and discourage developing countries from blocking Taiwan from multilateral organizations. The Taiwan-U.S.-Japan Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) allows Taipei to share its expertise in public health, disaster relief, energy cooperation, media literacy, and good governance; it hosted virtual seminars on combating pandemic disinformation.^{76, 77} “Digital Minister” Audrey Tang’s TED talk, “How Digital Innovation Can Fight Pandemics and Strengthen Democracy,” has 350,000 views,⁷⁸ and in October the German philanthropic organization Bertelsmann Stiftung asked her to discuss using digital tools to foster democracy.⁷⁹
 - **Expansion of legislative diplomacy:** Taipei has expanded virtual and in-person visits with foreign legislatures to showcase its democratic principles. When Beijing accused the Czech senate president of “crossing a red line” when he declared himself “a Taiwanese” before the Legislative Yuan (LY) in September, 70 Canadian, European, and U.S. lawmakers protested China’s coercive diplomacy.⁸⁰ After Germany took a tougher stance on China,⁸¹ the Bundestag hosted an exchange between its human rights committee and Taiwanese politicians, including Tang.⁸² Although governments have not moved to recognize Taipei, these efforts show growing support for Taiwan as a member of the democratic community.
 - **Regional security fora:** Admitting Taiwan into multilateral regional security forums could bolster its global integration and protect it from aggression. After an October meeting, the United States called on the Quad (an informal strategic dialogue with Australia, India, and Japan to counter Chinese regional aggression) to include countries that support a “free and open Indo-Pacific region.”⁸³ Taiwan has not been included in virtual meetings of the Quad Plus—adding New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam—to discuss COVID-19 mitigation and economic revival,⁸⁴ but Quad partners’ outreach suggests openness to drawing Taiwan into political-security fora. The nonpartisan think tank Australian Strategic Policy Institute had Tsai as the keynote speaker at its inaugural Indo-Pacific Leaders Dialogue in August.⁸⁵

Looking Forward: Taiwan's Challenges and U.S. Implications

Taiwan's ability to mitigate a nontraditional global security threat may provide the conditions for the island to assert its autonomy from mainland China through economic and political outreach. At the same time, Taiwan's success provides opportunities for the United States to advocate for the island's sovereignty while reengaging with the international community, particularly likeminded partners that share U.S. interest in maintaining strategic primacy and a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific to counterbalance a rising China.

The pandemic has reinforced the significance of global supply chains and has pushed countries, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, to realize how Taiwan can help them avoid overreliance on China. Could this foster greater international economic cooperation with Taipei, especially in digital protection? Could Taiwan be a model for economic "decoupling" from China⁸⁶ for Australia, Japan, Vietnam, and the United States? The new U.S. administration has indicated willingness to "impose costs" for China's aggressiveness toward Taiwan.⁸⁷ And, it will restart funding to the WHO,⁸⁸ giving Taiwan an influential advocate to encourage other members to support extending observer status to the island. Bipartisan agreement on Taiwan's unique role as an economic and security wedge against China's rise⁸⁹ could yield concrete advantages for Taiwan, such as an FTA, which has strong bipartisan U.S. congressional support.⁹⁰

Yet the United States will also have to grapple with challenging questions as it manages the U.S.-Taiwan-China dynamic and as the world emerges from the current, but likely not the last, global pandemic. Should Washington reevaluate the one-China policy?⁹¹ U.S. foreign policy pundits across the political spectrum have called to end strategic ambiguity over U.S. willingness to defend Taiwan.⁹² Should Washington hold meetings with Taipei?⁹³ At what level of government?⁹⁴ Should Washington pursue advanced weapons sales and other policies that would anger Beijing while it seeks Beijing's cooperation on climate change and other global security dilemmas? Would a U.S.-Taiwan FTA bolster security efforts, such as protecting supply chains in high-tech sectors—as much as economic ties? Would including Taiwan in the U.S.'s planned global Summit for Democracy⁹⁵ send a signal of broad-based support for Taiwan's elevated standing in the international community? How much leverage would such action gain for Taiwan inclusivity when weighed against the EU's recent signing of an investment agreement with China?⁹⁶ At the same time, China will continue to work to isolate Taiwan on the international stage (see box).⁹⁷ China's assertion of control over Hong Kong raises the possibility that a clear defense commitment from Washington might be a necessary risk—for Beijing would see this as a direct challenge—to protect and ensure Taiwan's self-governance.⁹⁸ At minimum, the consistency of U.S. support for Taiwan's autonomy and integration into the global community will be key to answering: Will the coronavirus pandemic create the conditional ripeness needed for Taiwan to pursue its sovereignty? Beyond security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan's handling of the pandemic also raises questions for how the United States could recalibrate its national security approach in the post-COVID-19 world. Can the United States prepare for a future pandemic as Taiwan learned from SARS? How will the pandemic transform the U.S. approach to understanding the links between public health and national security?

CHINA'S INCREASINGLY AGGRESSIVE POSTURE

2019

- January: President Xi Jinping refuses to renounce use of force to carry out Taiwan's unification with China.⁹⁹
- March: Chinese warplanes cross Taiwan Strait median line for first time in 20 years.¹⁰⁰
- June-September: Beijing's increasingly harsh response to Hong Kong's prodemocracy demonstrations fuels solidarity rallies in Taipei of 10,000 to 100,000 participants.¹⁰¹
- July-August: China holds a series of joint-service military exercises near Taiwan¹⁰² after issuing a Defense White Paper reiterating Xi's refusal to renounce use of force to achieve unification.¹⁰³
- November: China sails second, and first domestically built, aircraft carrier through Taiwan Strait, as Taipei charges pre-presidential election intimidation.¹⁰⁴

2020

- January-October: Median crossings grow in frequency and size to highest number in any one year since 1990.¹⁰⁵
- June: China passes and enforces National Security Law in Hong Kong, leading President Tsai to comment that "one country, two systems is not feasible."¹⁰⁶

- August-October: China conducts series of live-fire exercises increasingly closer to Taiwan.¹⁰⁷
- September: Record 37 fighter and bomber aircraft cross Taiwan Strait median line over two days during senior-level U.S. visit, while Chinese foreign ministry spokesman scoffs at "median line."¹⁰⁸
- December: Chinese television broadcasts documentary on PLA's 2020 training for Taiwan invasion and urban combat with main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.¹⁰⁹
- December: China sails newest aircraft carrier through Taiwan Strait, leading four warships to South China Sea exercise, one day after U.S. naval vessel transits Strait.¹¹⁰

2021

- January: Hong Kong police arrest 53 people under National Security Law for "subverting state power" by holding primaries for pro-democracy candidates in 2020,¹¹¹ leading Taiwan government to note "the Hong Kong Basic Law meant to protect the rights of Hong Kong people [by embodying "one country, two systems"] has become nothing but words."¹¹²
- January: China flies 28 warplanes over two days (January 23-24) into Taiwan's air defense identification zone (ADIZ),¹¹³ following record 380 Chinese flights into ADIZ in 2020.¹¹⁴

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If you have comments, questions, or a suggestion for a *Research Short* topic or article, please contact the NIU Office of Research at NIU_OOR@dodiiis.mil.

Appendix

Scientific Best Practices Help Flatten COVID-19 Curve and Build Trust


Taiwan's suppression of COVID-19 can be attributed to clear, consistent communication with the public and lessons learned from its 2003 SARS outbreak, which sickened 671 Taiwanese and killed 84—9 times the mortality of COVID-19 as of February 22, 2021.¹¹⁵ Immediately after its first COVID-19 case was confirmed, Taipei activated its SARS-inspired Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC), a multidisciplinary health disaster management team led by the health minister.^{116, 117} Taipei applied the same data mining techniques and analytics it used to identify COVID-19 cases¹¹⁸ to resource management, publishing face mask tracking maps, for example, to show the public which pharmacies had them in stock.¹¹⁹ This transparency, the health minister's daily briefings, and frequent public service announcements from the vice president, a trained epidemiologist,^{120, 121} have fueled public trust and cooperation.

According to polling data from February through June 2020, 91 percent of Taiwanese were satisfied with Taipei's handling of the outbreak.¹²² A recent survey from December 2020 shows 85 percent of Taiwanese respondents were satisfied with the government's pandemic response (Figure 3 Appendix).¹²³ Although President Tsai's approval rating has moderated since a record high of 71 percent in May, she still enjoyed the approval of the majority of Taiwanese in December largely due to her government's handling of the pandemic.¹²⁴

Although Taiwan has only intermittently mandated wearing face masks,¹²⁵ one survey shows at least 77 percent of Taiwanese respondents have worn them in public since February 2020 (Figure 4 Appendix).¹²⁶

Taipei's COVID-19 mitigation success is noteworthy given that the WHO and WHA have not invited Taiwan to emergency coronavirus meetings¹²⁷ and have restricted information-sharing,^{128, 129} even though it was Taiwan that had warned the WHO of potential human-to-human transmission as early as December 31, 2019. After meeting with health officials in Wuhan, Taiwanese infectious diseases specialists feared China was concealing information and warned the world that human transmission was possible on January 16, 2020, four days before China admitted it.^{130, 131} Despite only one case of community transmission since April 2020, Taiwan enacted stricter prevention measures in December to prevent any uptick at the Lunar New Year, including

Figure 3. Taiwan Public Satisfaction of Government's Handling of COVID-19 Outbreak (December 2020)




Source: "National Opinion Survey in December 2020," Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation, December 29, 2020, <https://www.tpof.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/2020年12月記者會書面資料V2.pdf>.

mandating face mask wearing in eight high-risk public venues¹³² and, as of January 1, 2021, banning most foreign arrivals.¹³³


In contrast to China’s efforts to censor information,¹³⁴ conceal disease severity, and punish whistleblowers,¹³⁵ Taiwan’s political messaging has touted democratic values as instrumental in battling COVID-19, fostering local pride and solidarity.¹³⁶ As shown in Figure 5, a record high 67 percent of the population identified solely as Taiwanese in the annual Taiwanese/Chinese identity poll conducted by National Chengchi University rather than both Chinese and Taiwanese (28 percent) or only Chinese (a record low 2 percent).¹³⁷

Figure 4. Self-Reported Measures Taken by Taiwanese Respondents to Prevent COVID-19



Source: “Personal measures taken to avoid COVID-19,” YouGov, February 8, 2021, <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/international/articles-reports/2020/03/17/personal-measures-taken-avoid-COVID-19>.

Figure 5. Changes in Taiwanese Self-Identification, 1992-2020



Source: “Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity (1992-2020.06),” Core Political Attitudes Trend Chart, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, <https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961>

A body of East Asia and political science scholars have pointed to Taiwan’s democratization—launched with the first multiparty legislative election in 1986—as the source of a growing Taiwanese national identity and impetus toward self-determination.^{138, 139} Some have further noted that this civic nationalism is driven not only by the “Taiwanization” of the island’s political system but also by China’s threat posture¹⁴⁰—even as Beijing’s military build-up and refusal to renounce force in pursuing unification restrain Taipei from asserting its independence. Indeed, the sharp rise in Taiwanese identity in 2019 and 2020, seen in Figure 5, most likely has been influenced by China’s increasingly aggressive behavior.

Endnotes

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
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Government Action

- 12/31/19 Begins inspecting passengers from Wuhan for fever and pneumonia; requires quarantine with living allowance; warns WHO of potential for human-to-human transmission
- 01/13/20 Infectious disease specialists meet with Wuhan counterparts about outbreak
- 01/16/20 Centers for Disease Control publicly warns world of possibility of human-to-human transmission
- 01/20/20 CDC stockpiles 44 million surgical masks, 1.9 million N95 masks, and 1,100 negative-pressure isolation rooms
- 01/21/20 Activates Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) to coordinate government response
- 01/23/20 Daily briefings begin on case statistics, government mitigation actions, and public guidance; Vice President, an epidemiologist, issues regular public service announcements
- 01/24/20 Bans export of face masks; CDC and eight hospitals begin COVID-19 testing
- 01/25/20 Bans entry of visitors from Hubei Province
- 01/27/20 Health Insurance Administration and Immigration Agency integrate patients' health data and travel history to track high-risk individuals
- 01/29/20 Begins cell phone monitoring of quarantined individuals
- 02/01/20 Rations face masks
- 02/02/20 Invests \$7 million to boost surgical mask production to 10 million/day
- 02/03/20 Launches national mask distribution and tracking system to publicly identify pharmacies with masks in stock
- 02/05/20 Prohibits entry of Chinese nationals
- 02/07/20 Prohibits entry of foreign nationals recently in China
- 02/10/20 Suspends all passenger flights to/from China
- 02/18/20 Gives hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies access to patients' travel data
- 03/19/20 Mandates 14-day quarantine for travelers to Taiwan and close contacts of confirmed cases
- 04/01/20 Requires face masks on public transit; donates 10 million masks to medical workers in U.S. and 11 European countries, and 51 million masks across rest of world
- 04/10/20 Implements crowd control measures at public venues
- 04/13/20 Mandates face masks at shopping districts and traditional and night markets
- 04/23/20 Extends ban on direct cross-strait flights and traveler transits through Taiwan
- 06/07/20 Eases restrictions: passengers can remove masks on public transit if social distancing can be maintained; food service on trains resumed; visitor flow controls lifted at tourist attractions
- 06/24/20 Requires foreign nationals to show English-language certificate of negative COVID-19 test taken within 3 days before flight and to quarantine for 14 days
- 08/05/20 Mandates face masks on public transportation and in schools, places of worship, medical and health facilities, entertainment venues, markets, and large social events
- 12/01/20 Imposes strict new measures to prevent winter transmission, requiring all inbound and transit passengers to submit negative COVID-19 tests, strengthening notification and testing strategies, reinstating August mask mandates to also include exhibitions/sporting events, and public customer service centers
- 12/30/20 CECC announces purchase of 20 million vaccine doses, with priority for health-care workers
- 01/01/21 Bans most foreign arrivals; requires 14-day quarantine for business travelers
- 01/19/21 Cancels Taiwan Lantern Festival, a major Lunar New Year celebration
- 01/20/21 Cancels Taipei Lunar New Year market
- 01/22/21 Bans large-scale events in train stations
- 01/25/21 Orders 5,000 people with links to Taoyuan General Hospital to quarantine; closes all schools in Taoyuan
- 01/27/21 Introduces three-phase emergency COVID-19 response
- 01/28/21 Restricts train tickets and bans eating/drinking on trains during Lunar New Year
- 02/19/21 CECC announces plans for 45 million total vaccine doses, including from domestic producers



■ Daily Cases ■ Daily Deaths ■ 7 per. Mov. Avg. (Daily Cases)