TRANSFORMING RESERVE COMPONENT INTELLIGENCE

Conference Proceedings
5 June 2003
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INTELLIGENCE
Panel on Reserve Components Intelligence Transformation Issues
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Joint Military Intelligence College
Conference on
Transforming Reserve Component Intelligence

Thursday, 5 June 2003

Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Tighe Auditorium,
Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, DC

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

0700-0825 Registration
DIAC Lobby

0825-0830 Welcome
A. Denis Clift, President, JMIC

0830-0900 Opening Address
Mr. Mark Ewing, Deputy Director, DIA

0900-0930 Keynote Address
Dr. John Winkler

0945-1145 Panel One
Reserve Components Intelligence Transformation Issues,
Mr. Kenneth Dumm, Panel Chair

1200-1400 Luncheon

1420-1450 Keynote Address
Honorable Albert C. Zapanta

1500-1700 Panel Two
Reserve Components Intelligence Support to Homeland Defense,
RADM James Manzelmann, USNR, Panel Chair

1700-1710 Closing Remarks
Dr. Ronald Garst, Provost, JMIC

1715-1815 Reception
DIAC Patio, Courtesy JMIC Foundation
WELCOMING REMARKS
Transforming Reserve Component Intelligence

A. Denis Clift
President, Joint Military Intelligence College

It is wonderful to have you with us at this conference on “Transforming Reserve Component Intelligence.” Conferences such as this are a part of the work of the faculty of a good college. As another part of our work we were meeting with the Board of Visitors and one of the members of the board, Dr. Ernest May, of the Kennedy School at Harvard said, “Denis, do you know the difference between a tenured professor and a terrorist?” I said no. He said “the difference is with a terrorist you can sometimes negotiate.” We have a lot of professors here this morning. I ask you to stay on guard, I ask you to enjoy yourselves mightily during the course of the day.

Sixty years ago in March 1943, Major General Omar Bradley arrived in Algeria to join the staff of his West Point classmate, Lieutenant General Dwight David Eisenhower, Commander in Chief of Allied Forces, Allied Headquarters in the Mediterranean Theater. In his memoirs of those years, A Soldier’s Story, General Bradley would write,

“In their Intelligence Activities at Headquarters, the British easily outstripped their American colleagues. The tedious years of prewar study the British had devoted to areas throughout the world gave them a vast advantage, which we never overcame. The American Army’s long neglect of intelligence training was soon reflected in the ineptness of our initial undertakings. Had it not been for the uniquely qualified reservists,” Bradley wrote, “who so capably filled many of our intelligence jobs throughout the war, the Army would have found itself badly pressed for intelligence personnel.”

Immediately following the war, the Army Chief of Staff, General of the Army Eisenhower, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, respectively, created the Army Strategic Intelligence School and the Naval Intelligence School in the belief that it was essential to have a continuing stream of educated officers coming into the intelligence ranks given the challenges of the new era. Ten years ago, 1993, this college opened a new chapter in its service to the nation with the establishment of the Postgraduate Intelligence Program for the Reserves. Over the past ten years, more than 300 members of the reserves — Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Air National Guard, National Guard — have moved through the college. More than a third have received their Master’s degrees, an incredibly high percentage for any part-time graduate program. Graduates of the program have a splendid record of accomplishment, of achievement, and of promotion. To cite one example, Commander Becky Lewis is a graduate of the program. She is a member of the faculty, and over the past year she has been a pioneer, together with Professor Mark Weisenbloom of the college, in creating an excellent new course on Counterterrorism Analysis, which is way out on the cutting edge of teaching in this field.
The research our graduates have conducted as part of their master’s work has contributed to the literature and the national security of the United States. To cite two outstanding examples, the non-proliferation findings of one thesis would become part of the law of the land. The richness and eloquence of another thesis on naval intelligence in the 18th century would lead to its hard cover publication and subsequent national acclaim. I commend Lieutenant Colonel Doman McArthur, United States Marine Corps Reserve, and Captain Steven Maffeo, United States Naval Reserve, the authors of those works, who are both here today.

Many of the Reserve Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers graduating from the postgraduate intelligence program for reserves are today playing leading roles in transforming reserve component intelligence in the early 21st century, and it is our hope that this conference will in turn contribute most positively to a fuller appreciation of the extraordinary contributions of the Reserves today, and of work more remarkable still in the years to come.

I thank you for being here, and it is now my privilege and pleasure to introduce this morning’s opening speaker, a true leader of defense intelligence, the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Mr. Mark Ewing.
BIOGRAPHY

A. Denis Clift
President, Joint Military Intelligence College

A. Denis Clift was appointed President of the Joint Military Intelligence College in 1994. The College, in the Department of Defense, is the nation’s only accredited academic institution awarding the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree and the Bachelor of Science in Intelligence degree. In 1999, in his role as president of the college, Mr. Clift was elected to serve as a Commissioner on the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools for the term 2000-2002. In 2002, he was re-elected for the term 2003-2005. Since 1992, he has also served as a U.S. Commissioner on the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on Prisoners of War/Missing in Action, a commission created by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin with the humanitarian goal of accounting for servicemen still missing from past conflicts.

Mr. Clift was born in New York City. He was educated at Friends Seminary, Phillips Exeter Academy (1954), Stanford University (B.A. 1958), and The London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London (M.Sc. 1967). He began a career of public service as a naval officer in the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations and has served in military and civilian capacities in ten administrations, including 13 successive years in the Executive Office of the President and The White House. From 1971-1976, he served on the National Security Council staff. From 1974-1976, he was head of President Ford’s National Security Council staff for the Soviet Union and Eastern and Western Europe. From 1977-1981 he was Assistant for National Security Affairs to the Vice President of the United States. From 1991-1994, he was Chief of Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, following service as an Assistant Deputy Director and Deputy Director for External Relations of the Agency. He is a veteran of two Antarctic expeditions, including the 1961 Bellingshausen Sea Expedition. From 1963-1966, he was Editor, United States Naval Institute Proceedings.

His awards and decorations include the President’s Rank of Distinguished Executive, awarded by President George W. Bush in 2001, the President’s Rank of Meritorious Executive, awarded by President Ronald Reagan in 1986, the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, the Secretary of Defense’s Meritorious Civilian Service Medal, the Secretary of the Navy’s Commendation for Achievement, the Oceanographer of the Navy’s Superior Achievement Award, and the Director of Central Intelligence’s Sherman Kent Award and Helene L. Boatner Award. He directed the production of the film “Portrait of Antarctica” screened at the Venice Film Festival. His published fiction and nonfiction include the novel A Death in Geneva (Ballantine Books of Random House), Our World in Antarctica (Rand McNally), With Presidents to the Summit (George Mason University Press), and Clift Notes: Intelligence and the Nation’s Security (JMIC Writing Center Press).
Board Memberships

- Advisory Board, *Joint Force Quarterly*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, since 1994
- Editorial Board, *Studies in Intelligence*, DCI’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, since 1995
- Steering Committee of the Intelligence and Policy Project, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, since 2000
- Board of Trustees, Consortium of Universities of the Washington Metropolitan Area, since 2002
OPENING REMARKS

Mr. Mark Ewing
Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Thank you Denis, and on behalf of the Director of DIA, I would also like to welcome you all to the Defense Intelligence Agency. We are very honored to host so many distinguished guests. I also offer my special thanks to senior leaders of our country’s reserve components for your attendance. Your presence honors us, and it ensures that this will be a very productive conference. I also want to acknowledge the presence of foreign attaches. We hope that you will learn how important a role reserve components play in our national security and particularly in our defense intelligence community.

This morning I have a three-part message: I would like to talk about JMIC, a lot about the reserve components, and also give you a vision that we have for the transformation that’s required within defense intelligence. First, I want to acknowledge and to thank the Joint Military Intelligence College and President Clift for organizing this important conference. DIA is very proud of the college, its high level of excellence, and its contribution to the education of the intelligence professional.

The JMIC makes a difference. Its contributions are simply more than a value added. The complexities of today’s global environment require highly educated officers who know how to reason, and JMIC ensures an important segment of our workforce is well prepared for the challenge. The Joint Military Intelligence College is the U.S. Intelligence Community’s only degree-granting educational institution providing undergraduate and graduate education in intelligence and conducting intelligence research on intelligence and intelligence-related topics. Its excellence is reflected in its recent selection to become a member in the consortium of Universities of the Washington metropolitan area. JMIC students today have ever-greater educational opportunities. Endeavoring to be the Intelligence Community’s center of excellence in education, in its forty-first year the college has become the de facto national defense intelligence college, and it is now transforming the strategic alliance with its community partners to make that status official.

It is an exciting time for the staff, faculty and students. Students are usually fairly critical customers. I remember my own assessment of the best year of my life at a certain military school in Kansas. From my perspective, there were many times I wasn’t sure which Leavenworth institution I was attending. I should note however, I wasn’t the greatest student. It’s different at the JMIC, I will never forget a few years ago when I was speaking with some recent graduates of the Postgraduate Intelligence Program. The group of young captains to the man characterized their experiences at JMIC as quote “nothing short of world class.” Many other graduates I know have subsequently reinforced that characterization. I was impressed and I am more so since joining DIA and having had the opportunity to better understand the college. We in the Intelligence Community have never received a better return on an investment. JMIC graduates, enlisted, officers, and civilians, are better prepared than any group I know to provide our country with world-class defense-related intelligence support.
My hat is also tipped to the reserve components. DIA and the larger defense intelligence community rely on the reserve components to join us at critical times, and in critical mission areas. Having a large percentage of reserve components in the Postgraduate Intelligence Program for reserves is particularly notable and very important. The fact that reserve students have such a high course-completion rate, and three times the national average completion rate for a Master’s Degree in a part-time program, given all the demands of job and family, reflects yet again the extraordinary commitment reserve volunteers make to our country, to the Defense Department, and certainly to the U.S. Intelligence Community. So thank you President Clift, the College, and the leaders of the reserve components for doing what you do every day to strengthen our Intelligence Community.

A few years ago I was in uniform nearly every Friday night or Saturday morning. Over a three-year period, I boarded a plane to Oakland, California or to Detroit, Michigan, or Salem, Oregon or numerous other cities to work with, to advise and mostly to learn from our reserve component units. These experiences taught me to greatly respect the men and women who comprise today’s reserve components. The expertise, the unbelievable dedication and commitment they exercise every day are frankly remarkable. I hope all of us in full-time government service truly understand the contributions you make. Since 9/11, thousands of reserve intelligence personnel have temporarily set aside their personal lives and made significant contributions to our national security.

Within DIA alone, 9/11 mobilized 40 percent of our Air Force reservists, 50 percent of Navy, and 70 percent of the Army reservists. Wherever one looks in DIA, you will find reservists making absolutely critical contributions. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, you find reservists providing critical expertise on chemical and biological intelligence support teams seeking evidence of Weapons of Mass Destruction, debriefing and interrogating key members of the enemy leadership, conducting special human intelligence operations, providing measurement and signature intelligence support to special operations forces, exploiting captured documents and computer media, and contributing to and supervising intelligence analysis at all levels of command. In addition, you will find them providing critical linguist skills to the interrogation efforts in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and to the document exploitation effort at the national media exploitation center here in Washington. They provide analytical expertise to the J2 Joint Staff Iraq Intelligence Task Force, and now contribute the full range of intelligence expertise in support of the Iraq Survey Group and its Washington-based fusion center. Thousands of reservists over the larger defense intelligence community operate our joint intelligence centers located across the United States and provide critical warfighting support. We could not function effectively without them. And lest I forget, the DIA mission of providing terrorism warning to the unified commands could not have been accomplished without the reserve augmentation starting
shortly after 9/11 and continuing to this day. Our Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism has achieved so much in such a short time because of the reserve contribution which filled a critical gap while we hire the necessary permanent work force to perform this new, complex mission.

I want to emphasize that reservists have not only provided exceptional intelligence expertise, but also strong leadership. A great example is the leadership of Army Colonel Dyer. With minimum notice, Colonel Dyer assumed management of the DIA-run national intelligence support activity in Kansas City, Missouri at a time when it was experiencing significant management problems. He rose to the occasion. He made unbelievable management improvements, all of which received the highest compliments from the Inspector General. And, with many other super leaders, like Colonel Dyer, we have learned again there is very little if anything that the reserve components cannot do as well or better than permanent staff.

What an amazing nearly two years it has been since 9/11! Defense Intelligence could not have accomplished its missions without these men and women. They deserve our thanks, as do you. Many of you are leaders who recruited and trained such outstanding citizens. Over the past ten years we have come a long way in our relations with the reserve components, and we have come a long way as a defense intelligence community. But if we are to support defense customers as they transform, further change is needed. In DIA we have a vision, and I’ll share an abbreviated version with you.

At the time of DESERT STORM, most weapons were dumb; there was no Intelink or Intelligence Community video teleconferencing capability. Information flow was constrained. We had only limited or local employment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Target packages were hard copy and hand delivered. The National Military Joint Intelligence Center supporting the Joint J2 had over 900 hundred people assigned to work the crisis. We came a long way to the time of “Enduring Freedom.” Most weapons were smart — precision guided. The Joint Intelligence World Wide Communications System or JWICS with Intelink and its VTC capability was the dissemination backbone. Intelligence was being merged with operations information and it was free-flowing. UAVs were used as the surveillance workhorse, target packages were in digital form, and intelligence production was federated across many intelligence organizations dispersed throughout the world. The National Military Joint Intelligence Center had a task force of fewer than 100 people.

What changes we have made! But we have a ways to go. We too, need to transform. Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 provide new operational concepts. The key is decision superiority. We can achieve that with persistent surveillance and with a network-centric operational environment. The intelligence capability needed for a transformed military cannot simply be extrapolated from today. As our director likes to say, “Some big-time paradigm busting is required.” So what kind of intelligence capabilities do we require? The capabilities must allow us to defeat today’s threats, and to identify and to meet tomorrow’s challenges, identify anomalies on a global basis, and constantly refresh baseline knowledge. The kind of intelligence support we are providing is shifting. In the future it needs to facilitate decisionmaking rather than only warfighting, be interpretative
rather than descriptive, be based on judgment rather than on assessment, be prescriptive rather than predictive, be preemptive rather than preventive and support information warfare, not just information operations. DoD’s transformation goals place a new premium on addressing surprise. We in the Intelligence Community must narrow the space where surprise can occur and mitigate the impact when it does. In considering the threat, we must judge the impact of not interdicting.

Within DIA, our desired objective is a partnership of highly skilled people, and leading-edge technologies to provide warfighters, policymakers, and planners with assured access to acquired intelligence. To achieve it, we need to break the reconnaissance paradigm. We need targeted, intrusive, persistent access on demand; we need emphasis on long-dwell sensors, but not solely technical sensors. Intelligence capability needs to be developed and applied as a system of systems, and we need better integration of all sensors, national, theater, tactical, and commercial. We also need information management prior to knowledge management. That’s easily said. To achieve this we need to put information into a form where it can be managed. We could take the lead from the commercial sector; for example, follow its lead in content tagging. We need to adopt data standards now, as well as build an all-source tasking, processing, exploitation and dissemination architecture. The idea of data ownership is history. In other words, interoperability at the data level, not the systems level, is a necessary attribute of a transformed military and intelligence environment. It enables horizontal integration of information from all sources and at all levels of classification.

Turning to the analytical environment, analysts will need immediate, on-demand access to all sources of data. To do this, we will need to achieve real-time collector-exploiter-analyst partnership. Integration, not just interoperability, will be the key, and we will need to emphasize data interpretation over data management. My point here is that the concept of decision dominance demands rapid conversion of information into knowledge. That’s what we pay analysts to do. They must have full access to collection output and be supported by carefully employed information technology.

So we believe that defense intelligence needs to be transformed until we achieve an end-state characterized by surveillance as a distinctive form of collection by all-source analysis, and by information content management. What I described is a dramatically different and unfamiliar business process. It includes unfamiliar partnerships and prerogatives. To achieve it, some sacred cows will have to be slaughtered.

In conclusion, we believe the defense intelligence community needs to change accordingly if we are to be responsive to our principal military customer. If we can get the defense community to agree, I assure you it will be an interesting journey. The reserve components will need to join us. Your role will be as important in our proposed end-state as it is today, perhaps more so. Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes my remarks, and I want to thank you again for listening. I wish you well in your discussions today. I would love to be able to participate, but we’re focused on the Iraq Survey Group right now, and I assure you it is a full-time job. So I thank you very much for your attendance and I wish you well.
BIOGRAPHY

Mark W. Ewing
Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

In October 2000, Mr. Mark W. Ewing was appointed Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, a combat support agency with military and civilian personnel stationed worldwide. Mr. Ewing had been most recently assigned as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Mr. Ewing has had extensive military experience. During his career in the Army, he was involved in all U.S. intelligence disciplines in various command and staff positions for more than 20 years. He has held tactical and strategic assignments with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence; the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters Department of the Army; the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters Department of the Army; the Army Personnel Center; Field Station Sinop; I Corps; and the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions. He has supervised intelligence, combat engineer and signal units; served as the systems integrator for 15 U.S. intelligence automation programs; and managed one of the Army’s largest automated training programs. His assignments included Europe, Korea, Vietnam, and Latin America.

Mr. Ewing has received the Bronze Star (with Oak Leaf Cluster), the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Army Meritorious Service Medal (with six Oak Leaf Clusters), and the Army Civilian Meritorious Service Medal.

Mr. Ewing is a graduate of the University of Minnesota, the Army Command and General Staff College, and the National War College.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Dr. John Winkler
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
Manpower and Personnel

Good Morning! It is a real pleasure to be here today. I bring best wishes from members of my office, Assistant Secretary Tom Hall, principal deputy Craig Duerhing, as well as our boss, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David Chu. Also, I would like to thank you for inviting me. President Clift, it is a real pleasure to be here. The Joint Military Intelligence College is the nation’s only accredited institution of higher learning awarding the Masters of Science of Strategic Intelligence and a Bachelors of Science in Intelligence. That’s pretty impressive! I would like to talk to you later about trading mine in.

What I would like to do is talk to you a little bit this morning about the vision of transformation that we have in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and OSD Reserve Affairs, regarding the reserve components. In that regard, it was really good to hear Mr. Ewing talk today, to set a broad context for you in terms of the transformation
going on in intelligence. I will try to offer you additional context for the reserve component at large and where we stand now and where we are headed in the future of priority missions, how it will be organized and managed, and how the reserve and active components will fit together and work together in terms of active and reserve mix.

What I am going to do today is talk about a major review that we undertook last year. It is known as “Reserve Components Contribution to National Defense.” Therefore, the title is RCCND. Also, it is known in shorthand terms as the Comprehensive Review because of the language the Quadrennial Defense Review used in calling for a study looking at active/reserve force mix, priority missions, organizations and resources.

Unfortunately, the last QDR didn’t really get into reserve components matters. It said basically that we would look at that next year. I came on board with the OSD on Reserve Affairs in August 2001 and the QDR was published that September. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Chu, and our office, were tasked by Dr. Wolfowitz to conduct this particular review of the reserve components. We found as we went on with this what we were best-equipped to address was the reserve component elements as opposed to standing back and to trying to determine how many active divisions there ought to be. We focused on the reserve components, how they could support the active components and the best ways possible to do so. This briefing sketches out the principal ideas that we developed in looking at that. I’ll try to leave a little time at the end for any questions of interest you may have about what we did, what we really mean, or where we are going and for that matter, what our office could address. We’ll do that at the end.

Let me start with a little bit of background, what we aim to accomplish. Having been in the study business, one of the things I recall was the previous review of the active-force mix which ran about 8 to 10 volumes and about four thousand pages, full of analytics — a very good review. However, in this case, we were asked to do it all inside the Department of Defense and to do it in a fairly short timeframe. The whole thing kicked off in January of 2002, and our primary results were briefed to the Senior Level Review Group and the Senior Executive Council in March and April and we wrapped it up in June, July and August and published our document — which we can make available if you would like — in December. We knew that we had to do a compressed effort over a fairly short timeframe so our initial aim was to stay strategic — to stay at the high level rather than getting into the details and to establish some strategic principles, a broad blueprint, a general direction, concepts, ideas that in turn could be fleshed out and developed as time went on.

At the same time, given the history of these matters, and again I am recalling the previous QDR, we also attempted to think innovatively, be strategic and look forward and to come up with new ideas. The work-up to this occurred before 9/11. After that, it certainly became clear to us that reserve components and their contributions needed to be looked at very innovatively and differently. As Mr. Ewing said — and I really appreciate his comments — it was certainly clear after 9/11 just how important the contributions of the reserve components are to our national military efforts both in the immediate response of the terrorist’s attacks, the conduct of the campaign in Afghanistan, and in IRAQI FREEDOM.
From the very beginning we could see already that the ways in which the reserve components contributed were quite different from a textbook example. We were very cognizant of that and tried to look forward and sketch where we would be headed for the future. The basic assumptions that we brought to bear were that we were not looking to increase or to decrease anybody’s force size; this was the direction from Secretary Rumsfeld, who was pretty hard over with his interactions with Congress that active-duty end strength was not going to go up. The issue was, however, in terms of who does what to whom and as to how we were to mix the forces, and so on. We felt it could be addressed by looking at the end strength we have today in both the active and the reserve side of the house, by asking whether the allocation or capabilities could be different. In other words, what do the active forces and the reserves do? To what degree do they do them was really the issue, not how big one or the other ought to be. We started by sketching out and trying to understand as best we could the defense strategy, what it meant to be a capabilities-based force, what it meant to be no longer focused on two major theater wars, what kinds of threats, what kinds of operating environment, what kinds of major technological changes were looming in the future and within that, to take a look at the reserve component.

We started where the services saw them, and particularly looking for innovative ideas and best practices. One of the things you deal with in OSD, somewhat to the consternation of the services, is you tell the Army how the Air Force does business or the Air Force how the Navy does business or the Navy how the Army does business, and to try where you can to point to a good way of doing business that might work if done in its own way and in the culture of the respective service.

We could see a lot of that looking at seven reserve components, a real spectrum of different kinds of philosophies of where the reserve components fit and what they did and how they did it. There were many opportunities, we thought, for doing some leveraging and suggesting one practice that might take roots in a different service. We did take stock of those volumes I mentioned and tried to draw out some principles. One of the things that I think you find when you do review studies is that there are not new ideas. Whatever you come up with, somebody thought of before, but the question is, is the time right for the new idea? Some of the principles you will see here are familiar, and should be familiar to you. It just may be that it was never really primed for adoption. Now, we do our best to say this is the time to do these things. And we did this review as openly as we could, given the timeframe we worked in.

We were charged to lead the review through OSD Reserve Affairs. We had a team of people there, and I was more or less the de facto leader of this effort. Major General Bob St. John of the Army, who I think you may know, and General Burdick, the Deputy Assistant for Resources and Karen McKinney, St John’s principal director; we were the core of this effort. In addition, we brought in the J-8, and we worked closely with OSD Policy. We ran working groups in sessions at the O-6 level of the services and we extensively briefed the leadership. I think I must have briefed the Assistant Secretary for Manpower once every two months or so on where we were going. Therefore, we tried to build consensus.
I feel that, by the end of it all, we had fairly good agreement on general direction; ideas of where we were heading were generally well accepted. Now of course, the devil is in the details and that is always true; this is sort of where we are here today in taking the concept and really trying to put meat to the bone as we develop legislative initiatives, specific policies, and prototype programs. This is really where the services have to independently figure out if the concepts are good and how it might work best for them. We are very comfortable in that, and that’s the way it ought to be.

Similarly we continue to take counsel at this point from interested parties — stakeholders such as reserve associations — and we have implemented a new policy program addressing what their concerns are and how can we alleviate those concerns. So in some respects, the review may be over, but the process continues very much to this day.

Let me go a little bit now into the message, the substance of what we did in our review. I hope to give you a bit of context for looking at transforming reserve components intelligence. When all is said and done, our view of the future contribution of reserve components boils down to several major themes. The first was the issue of rebalancing of capabilities; what, how, and where was that necessary. How do we think about that in terms of where we feel we need more in the active, or more in the reserve force, and what kinds of new missions are appropriate, looking to the future of the ones where the reserve components potentially have a great deal to offer and where they need to be very much in the forefront. How do we, in turn, deal with the continuing demands made on our military services because missions don’t seem to go away — we are still in Sinai — are we going to be doing some things in Eastern Europe for the foreseeable future?

How do we balance all of that, and I think many of you have seen in the newspapers that our work here was also peppered — I guess is the right word — by regular little snowflakes coming down from the top asking questions about active/reserve force mix. Why do we have to depend on reserve components; why does it take so long to get forces ready; are we sacrificing strategic surprise because of the fact we are signaling our intentions in mobilizing the reserves? All of that is going on, and so what we try to do here is to address those concerns, both to explain and to help educate people on exactly what reserve components are bringing to the table. At the same time, we acknowledge that some rebalancing is needed, but let’s think carefully about how and where. So more than half or two-thirds of our review really addresses this issue of rebalancing.

If you look at our report, you will see a lot there, but there is also more that we’ve done since and in briefing the Secretary and engaging him on these matters. The second major theme deals with the management of people, and it flows from the first, if you have in mind different allocations of capabilities and different kinds of force structures in the future. In order to make that work, you have to have a new management paradigm, too. And
given the way we look at how the reserve components contribute, have contributed and will contribute, it is a good time to step back and look at whether our traditional ways of doing business in categorizing reserve component duty really makes sense for the future. So the second half, or the second part of our review looks hard at what we call continuum of service. That is our principal major new idea in this particular work.

This is a new paradigm for managing personnel that seeks to further integrate active and reserve component management systems and build a more integrated military workforce of full-time or part-time people working at varying levels of participation as their career allows them and the service needs them, as well as the traditional strategic reserve, our “base of reserve component” members. I will talk more about that in a moment. Those are our two major themes. We have also built some programs. We have looked, reviewed policies, begun some prototype programs and developed a series of initiatives to take to the Congress to allow for some of these things to occur.

We began with the area of rebalancing. I’ll talk a little about our major ideas here. Again, the basic problem is that we have some shortages. We have certain segments of our reserve component community where we seem to go again, again, and again; civil affairs is an example. We also have high demand, low-density weapon systems out there that we can’t necessarily afford to buy more of, but we need to think about how to get more output and more applied capability from them. So there are a variety of areas where we are looking forward, where we are worried that we may be straining the force or where we may need to do more. What do we do about that? In our assessment, we cut this problem into two categories. First, those kinds of things that have to do with shortages of weapon systems, platforms, equipment, and how the reserve components can fit into that scheme. Secondly, the more traditional one that we mostly think about, which is our skill shortages; where we have career fields that are potentially not deep enough, or we have emerging requirements that we have yet not met, and how do we deal with that side of things?

The chart here highlights basically the four major high-level strategic points we make. First, when we look on the platform side, the equipment side or the constraint side, one of the things that we find is that a very useful and effective model of mixing the active and reserve forces is to use reserve components to support active-component units; this is the ideal of what we call mixed units — reserve augmentation to active units systems. It goes by various names for the different services. The Air Force calls it the associate units or blended units. The Army would call it multi-compo units. The Navy might call it selective augmentation units — not those names exactly, but generally. The idea you have here is of a system, a full-time cadre of active-duty folks and then you have your reserve component units that fall in and provide that surge capability and provide for increased output, increased productivity out of the weapons system or the unit. The principal idea here is that within those kinds of unit construct we understand there are often personnel and administrative-related issues associated and we don’t think they are insurmountable. Those kinds of constructs for units we think are very effective and there ought to be more of them. I’ll talk more in a moment about that. Very briefly on the equipment side, we also talk about interoperability as being a critical dimension where you have not enough of
Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense:

Enhancing Capability and Improving Flexibility Through a New Approach to Managing Personnel

5 June 2003

Objectives, Assumptions, and Methodology of Review

Objectives
- Establish strategic principles to govern future structure and use of the Reserve components.
- Propose innovative options to meet requirements.

Assumptions
- Overall end strength remains constant.
- How AC and RC forces are used may change.

Methodology
- Identify the case for change.
- Review Services' approaches and plans for use of the RC.
- Extract and integrate insights from previous research; commission white papers; develop new ideas.
- Employ open, inclusive process with participation from:
  - Joint Staff, OSD, Services and RCs; Guard Adjutant Generals; SEC and SLRG.
  - Congressional members and staff; associations.
Two Major Themes of “RC Contributions to National Defense”

Issue: How to enhance capabilities and improve flexibility.
- Rebalance Active & Reserve force mix and mission assignments to enhance capabilities.
  - Resolve constraints and imbalances.
  - Meet requirements for emerging and traditional missions.
- Develop management policies that promote flexibility.
  - New Availability and Service paradigm - “Continuum of Service.”

Policy and legislative initiatives are being pursued.

Rebalance Force Mix: Resolve Constraints and Imbalances

Issue: How to help solve known critical shortages (LD/HD)?

Findings:
- RC augmentation to AC capabilities can increase output of major weapon systems.
- Targeted modernization of RC systems improves interoperability and adds to system availability.
- Deeper AC/RC pools are needed in career fields that are uniquely military (MPs, Chemical, Intel).
- RC can enhance access to civilian acquired skills (IT, civil affairs, linguists, foreign area specialists).

Platform-based
- “Mixed” Units
- Targeted Modernization

Skills-based
- Uniquely Military Skills
- Civilian Acquired Skills
Resolving Imbalances:
Potential Options for the Services

Platform-based shortages
- Create more AC/RC mixed units to increase sortie rates and firepower delivered.
  - Increase crew ratios.
    - Aircraft crews (fixed and rotary wing).
    - Combat engineer, transportation, and air defense units.
  - Add shifts.
    - Carrier flight decks.
    - Maintenance crews.

Civilian-acquired skills: Link via RC
- Harvest civilian acquired skills in military force.
  - Better databases to identify and access individuals.
  - Give military credit for civilian certifications.
- Develop partnerships and pilot programs with private industry.

Rebalancing the Force:
Emerging Missions

Issue: How can the RC help DoD address emerging requirements in high-tech operations and experimentation?

Findings: RC can access private sector expertise needed in high-tech areas and for experimentation. Remote support from CONUS enhances RC ability to contribute.

Options include:
- Expand use of “reach-back” and CONUS based global networks in Intel, Space, and Information Operations missions.
- Use RC to access cutting edge civilian acquired high-tech skills.
  - Build high-tech “Centers of Excellence” in areas of high density.
  - Tap civilian functional expertise.
- Support the AC in experimentation efforts:
  - Test equipment, tactics, doctrine, & procedures.
  - Act as Opposing Forces for field tests & exercises.
**New Availability and Service Paradigm**

**Issue: How to Enhance Flexibility in Personnel Management?**

**TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE**
- Full Time 365 days
- Traditional Reservists 39 Days
- Separate systems; difficult to transition between them.
- RC employed using multiple authorities.
- Mobilization or “workarounds” needed for extended duty beyond minimum obligation.
- Multiple management organizations.

**FUTURE STRUCTURE**
- Full Time 365 days
- Variable RC Pool 40-365 days
- Traditional Reservists 39 Days
- New Affiliation Programs 0-36 days
- Single system with ability to move between full-time and part-time status.
- Improves capability to manage workforce in flexible manner.
- Enhances ability to access “volunteers” and attract civilian skills from outside.
- “Contracts” with variable pool members set expectations and improve access.
- Reduces need for involuntary mobilization.
- Potential to merge duplicative structures.

**Continuum of Service**

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**Transformations Needed to Promote A More Flexible System**

- Facilitate transitions between part-time and full-time duty.
- Modify policies and rules that limit use of volunteers.
- Simplify access rules and duty statuses.
- Structure compensation and benefits to reward increased participation.
- Implement single personnel/financial system (DIMHRS).
- Program funds to support RC utilization.

A more flexible management system can enhance capabilities and support force rebalancing.
something on both sides and the inability of the two to train is really a problem. So we talked about things such as targeting pods and various kinds of precision systems that are brought to the reserve component and systems; principally, aircraft in the Air Force Reserve components and the Navy aviation arena, which would allow the active side to be beefed up and be more effective.

Now on the skill side, there are really two sub-themes here: where you have shortages, constraints or where you have to go to the well too often, and where you’re worried about the fact that you are maybe too dependent on the reserve components to conduct an operation. Well, the first sub-theme is that there are some skilled areas that really belong with active duty forces, as driven by the frequency of use — it is an everyday kind of thing or you have learned, given the evolution of your missions, that you need more of it than you had in active duty. Well, you have to step up to the plate on the active side and build some more of the capability. Now in the context of constant end strength what that means is, at the same time you build up uniquely military capability on the active side you probably have to take down some active-duty military capability and look hard at certain mission areas or capabilities you have — you might have too much. That may be the part that shifts over to the reserve components because at the same time, in the reserve components, you’ve got the same problem. You’ve got certain skill areas that are in high demand, and yours is clearly one of them — civil affairs another. One other solution is to build a deeper rotational pool in the reserve components so in turn you have to do some force structure balancing internal to the reserve component.

The review gets a little bit more into the principles and how you reason your way through that, but that’s the first sub-theme, and the second sub-theme which I think is perhaps germane as well, again you’re transforming reserve component intelligence, which is what you do in the case of a shortage skill that is really rooted in the civilian arena, in something like information technology. Is the solution here to build active-duty structure? We think probably not. It’s hard to grow, sustain, and maintain skills that have very active labor markets in the civilian side where the technology develops more rapidly. So one of our major themes really is that the reserve component is a gateway to the civilian world particularly where you are dealing with high-tech, cutting-edge kinds of skills, of which many find their way into your world.

And so we have some ideas about ways to tie together better the reserves and the civilian high-tech community and to draw capabilities from them. I would like to elaborate just a bit more on mixed units. We really like the associate-unit type construct. The principle you get and the way to think it through is to identify where you want to go with crew ratio and output. There are some studies out there that show that for a 50 percent increase for the crew ratio associated with the weapon system, you can double the output — sorties flown, ordnance delivered. That, in my mind, is a wonderful measure of merit that says if you have that capability to beef up your crew ratio and double your output you ought to do that. Sure, if we had an unlimited budget we could have great crew ratios three hundred and sixty five days a year. But we can’t afford that, so the way we think that this ought to be done is with reserve component augmentation. The associate unit does this for instance, because you have the reserve unit folks flying the mission,
doing the maintenance, doing the things that are needed at those times of surge. Here again, with this model (the idea of crew ratios) — and who else has aircrews except those with aircraft — we are back to using one service’s practice and saying others ought to look at it. In particular, I know we get into discussions about landing planes on flight decks, Apache helicopters and the like.

More importantly, you’ve got other weapons systems, other systems in the areas of transportation, air defense and engineering that, for your ground forces, would work with this kind of principle. So we end up trying to encourage the Army, for instance, to think about what they call a multi compo, but there are some subtle distinctions here. More of those kinds of units are in the area of combat engineering, transportation and air defense.

And for the Navy and the Marine Corps, the Navy in particular, this notion of increasing ratios — you now talk about adding ships — making that flight deck more beefed up for 24/7 operations, and using these sorts of augmentation units more extensively on Navy ships to improve the output productivity of these ships and maintenance, is another key area where augmentation works. Particularly, if you have surges in variability and maintenance work loads and you have the ability to bring reserve components, units and folks and to throw them into the mix for a while to deal with that increased workload, you’ve got an efficient system. You’ve got one that doesn’t keep skills on active duty all the time, but is able to draw on reserve components and to meet those periods of time where you have an increased workload. Now, over to the skill side, as I mentioned there are really two sub-issues here. This is the notion of what to do about “too much dependence on the reserve components,” meaning you go to the well too often or you do not have enough in the active force. As I said earlier, there are clearly some areas where we have advised the Secretary, and some the Secretary has developed on his own, and he has advised the services that they need some active-force structure. Security forces are a key area; the Air Force, for example, is particularly aware of the need and they plan to do it. I am not saying the services don’t acknowledge it. There are plans in 2004 to beef up these capabilities; the Army with some additional civil affairs, and the Air Force is tackling the security forces. But the point is, it is clear that some adjustments are needed in that regard and as I said earlier having deeper pools in the reserve components is also a part of the solution.

If you’ve been keeping up, the Army Reserve right now has some plans — Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative — as they call it, which really tackles this issue for them and looks to build up things like intelligence. It looks at some of their logistic structures as an example and asks whether some shifts are needed. The Army Guard has some plans as well. All services are addressing this. The Secretary may think it ought to go faster, but anyway that’s the issue. I mentioned earlier this issue of civilian skills. We think that there are some ways that we can do better at identifying: a) the skills that the reserve component members already have by virtue of what they do in their civilian lives, or how they have been educated and b) ways to engage the American business community in the high-tech arena to form partnerships and to provide people, provide capabilities, provide skills to the military forces. Now, in the first case, one thing that we have been doing — and it may surprise you we don’t have this — is to try to build into our personnel data systems
information on individual’s abilities, acquired skills, their degrees, what they have been educated in, the kind of work they’ve done, and make that part of the profile so in principle you could create a labor market, and match some high-tech needs with the people who have them and craft some tours with people who are interested and able to do that.

Until recently, our privacy act people told us you can’t make mandatory the collection of civilian employer information — what you do and who you work for. Luckily, we beat that one down and now that is in turn occurring. Colonel Crone may talk about it a bit more since he has been spearheading the effort to get that particular program off the ground. We also have been working on ways to, let’s say, leverage better our people’s investment in civilian skills. In the health arena for instance you can come into the military and you can kind of shortcut and bypass some of the training requirements because you are clearly already a doctor. Why aren’t we doing this in more cutting-edge areas? So we have been working hard to develop programs to allow for direct entry. In other words, acknowledging and recognizing the skills people already have, and putting them in an appropriate spot in military service.

And finally — partnerships with industry. In a moment I want to talk about high-tech and you will see what I mean in more detail. Again, we have a surge of volunteerism going on now, and I think that it will sustain itself; individuals who want to bring things to the table, corporations that want to partner with the Department of Defense for patriotic reasons, not merely for profit reasons. We think there are things that we can do in partnerships with organizations like, say, a Microsoft where you want to build an information warfare cell in partnership with them and some of their people. There are examples of that kind of thing going on. There is an Air National Guard program out in the State of Washington basically using reserve members who happen to work for Boeing and Microsoft who are applying their skills with the full support of their companies, cutting them a lot of slack in terms of time they spend in their reserve life, which is another thing that I am going to come to. Staying on the issue of rebalancing, and here again I think it is of particular interest to you when we look to the future and capabilities of the reserve components and where they can provide added value — the high tech areas, intelligence, information technology, information operations, space — and where the civil sector can augment experimentation or transformational attempts to try new ways of doing business, to invent new approaches and so on. For us at least, we see this as a unique, special skill that reserve component members and reserve component institutions can bring to the fight, because of the connection between reserve units, their communities, the employers, and the kind of people we have in the reserve components, and the kind of skills they bring to bear.

As we look forward, we think that the combination of high tech and reachback is a formula for the reserve components’ future contributions. Not just in terms of programs, like the JRCs (Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers) we love — we think they are a wonderful model and that kind of thing can work for other kinds of high tech skills — but even for the future formation of reserve capabilities. Going back to our partnership, if you can go to a high-tech center of excellence like Silicon Valley, or Route 128, or a Bellevue, Washington, or a Dulles Corridor, you can bring together a consortium of industries and
Continuum of Service: Major Themes

1. Create seamless flow between AC and RC during a military career
2. Establish new affiliation programs and encourage volunteerism
3. Simplify rules for accessing, employing, and separating reservists
4. Improve flexibility of compensation system
5. Enhance AC/RC career development

Complimentary to P&R Human Resources Strategic Plan

New Affiliation Programs: Current Areas of Interest

- Controlled Specialty IRR (temporary manpower pools)
  - Entry point into military of new pool of people (all ages)
  - With hard to grow/maintain skills or newly emerging skills
- Direct Entry Programs (mapping skills to MOSs/AFSCs)
  - To reduce/avoid training costs or to reduce accessions time
  - Similar to programs for lawyers, health care, chaplains, band
  - Patterned after Australian Defense Force Direct Entry Programs
- Community Partnerships (when cannot outsource 100%)
  - Working with communities, corporations, academia to provide certain skills/people to meet inherently military requirements that cannot be fully contracted out (can pull-back needed expertise into uniform)
- Expanded/New Service Auxiliaries (option for all Services)
  - Vehicles for civilian volunteers and retirees to support Service requirements (place for civilian surge volunteers)
individuals who are interested in working together. And we can easily imagine the formation of units where the skills are present in people who work through reachback, contributing to military capability. That kind of model we think is a very promising model for the future.

Similarly, we imagine that in the experimentation area, companies may play a role in developing the information warfare cell. Who better than the reserve component to figure out how to exploit and take advantage of the kind of the systems that are out there, given what they know and what they do outside the military in their civilian lives.

Let me move away from this capabilities discussion, and on my last couple of slides talk to you about continuum of service. Because I think now, after I go through this with you, you will see that we’ll want more associate-type of units and you need people who you can rely on to come in and give you that surge, and it might be more than the traditional reserve service.

How do we do that? This is a part of the answer to that. Plus, again, we think a new management paradigm recognizes the reality of reserve service recently and tries to build on it, make it better, and support it better. So, I will give you an over-simplified contrast between the Old World and the New World.

In the old world we have our active forces, we have our reserves, part time reserves—the traditional 39 days per year—of course nobody does that anymore but let’s just for a moment assume that people answer with this in mind—that you know they’re going to drill one weekend a month and a couple of weeks a summer. Maybe they’ll go off for an annual training period to do something interesting. But basically you are still looking at the very intermittent, very constrained part-time contribution, very separate from the active-component system. And each system has its own structure and its own personnel management systems. If you want to leave one and join another it’s a hassle. You leave active service and you are discharged.

Now, if you went into the Guard or the Reserves you are reassessed and if you are an officer you have to have the President sign your scroll again. It is all these sorts of things that separate these systems and mark the transitions between an active career to a reserve or vice-versa. What’s the alternative? I will use my old organization as an example, where we have basically one organization. But, when you talk to people and ask them, “How do you work here?” you get three kinds of stories: I am a full-time employee; this is my career and I’ve been here 10 years and I hope to be for 20; others say, I work here, but I work here half-time, I am just starting off and I am still finishing my degree, graduate school or maybe another alternative is that I am working here half time—I am beginning to look outside and to think about the phase of my life and sort of easing out a little bit, and I still enjoy being here and I want to be here for awhile. Then the third group of people you run into are your project consultants—the people who come in the door and spend six months, three months, nine months, one month—they are assigned to a particular project and they may be independent contractors. They may be working for you or they maybe working for somebody else—they may sign up without the expectation of a career. They
may say that I’ll give you a year, two years and then, because of my own personal profile, professionally I want to do something else.

What does that mean in military terms? Well, we have active, full-time folks who are in the Guard or Reserve, but you also have different people offering different levels of effort. Some people give you a block of time if they are able to work that out. An example, again back to the Air Force, of airline pilots working in the Air National Guard/Air Force Reserve who fly for the airline, then choose a furlough period, fly for the Air Force and they kind of balance out their careers. You have some people who are offering more than “traditional” time. And you have some people offering the traditional schedules.

In some respect, if you can build on reserve volunteerism, those people who are able and willing to give you more and want to give you more — whose own situation allows them to give blocks of time or build a part-time career that is bigger than the traditional approach — we think that it eases the burden on the ones who can’t. So, the extent to which there are certain capabilities in what we call the variable pool, there is a segment continuum that contains people who are signing up for more than the traditional. Again, you all are going to tell me that we do that already. Right, we do! However, we have terrible constraints — the 179-day rule, things like that, that make it hard for people who want to give you a year or two years, to do that, so our point here is not so much that this is a way of doing business that’s new and innovative: a) we think there is probably more opportunity here than is commonly realized, but b) we think that the systems ought to support this, that the management systems, the personnel pay systems, the rules that govern the use of reserve component members ought to support this kind of reserve volunteerism. And that’s counter-cultural as I think you all know, particularly for services that think in terms of units.

How do you do volunteerism? Well, you can do it, and there are units like the psychological operations unit out of Pennsylvania — Commando Solo — that do it as a unit. Okay! When TRANSCOM comes in, they talk about the need to prime the pump — the capabilities that are needed for opening the ports — which clearly you do not want to have on full-time active duty. Why don’t we look at some small detachments — companies consisting of people whose contract is: a) call me, I’ll be there; I am a volunteer fighter at home and I will do this kind of thing for the military, b) you can count on me for nine months or six months, and I can work that out — it’s okay with the family, I’ve worked things out with my employer — not everybody can, but some can. If you can capitalize on that reserve volunteerism, you can do a lot. You can provide that surge augmentation and get scarce skills to keep on active duty from among the professional community who are in information technology — those who decide they like the idea of a mixed career between the reserves and their civilian life. So we really believe that this has got some possibility and it needs to be promoted.

The other thing that we point to on the continuum is what we call the new affiliation programs, which are those kinds of folks who do not necessarily want a career at all, but who are interested in contributing something through the spirit of volunteerism. They can be military retirees who, when something happens like 9/11, may say, “Gee! I would like
to come back for a while. Hey! I do not want another career in the military, but I would
like to do something maybe as a volunteer, maybe, in uniform”; in other words, a person
with a limited-duration commitment to give. There are lots of other examples. We’ve
gotten cards from average citizens who want to do something and to bring a skill to the
table, bring themselves to the table as unpaid volunteers.

And so what ability do we have to capitalize on volunteerism and connect with those
people who want to bring a skill to the military? Not much! So Gary will talk about this
topic in depth because we have a number of ideas here about ways to enhance and inform
auxiliary organizations for the military to look at the individual ready reserve in a very
different way as kind of a talent pool. He’ll talk more about it. That’s the other piece.

What is the continuum of service? It is a single system composed of military members
working at varying levels of effort who are able to transition their level of effort from a
part-time level of contribution to a full-time level and back. But it is, most importantly, the
underlying systems that encourage that. What does that mean? The Secretary, I think you
know, has been looking at general flag officer management and asking whether we can
keep people longer. We need a system that facilitates transition. We need to do away with
179-day rules, we need to take the thirty-odd duty statuses that we have today— which are
different for every service, and confusing to a combatant command— and make
something simpler out of that which more accurately reflects what people do. We need to
review our compensation benefit system and see what we can do to encourage
volunteerism along a sliding scale, for example. I hope to see it, but we really need it, and
we need a philosophy of reserve use that says, “I am going to budget for some of the surge
that I need and I am going to plan for the reserves and they are going to be there when I
need them.”

We have, at least I have, taken the continuum service as my issue for the next period of
time. And we have in turn broken it down in lines of operations, if you will, and developed
policies and proposals, legislative things that basically try to attack the continuum and
support it by: encouraging seamless flow, allowing for these transitions, simplifying the
procedures for moving between one and the other, encouraging volunteerism, doing away
with constraints and silly rules that prevent volunteers from coming on board, and
allowing for different ways for people to contribute. Trying to simplify the duty status
system is a real challenge because there is a lot of fear there. All we are trying to do is to
basically develop a simpler, clearer, more coherent approach for bringing reservists on
active duty and supporting them during training.

Finally, on the issue of compensation for active reserve career development areas, we
are beginning to develop some specific policy proposals.

And that’s it. I hope with this you have a vision of what we’re doing, now that we know
where we see reserve components headed in the future and the kinds of structures and
personnel management systems that we would encourage, and hopefully looking at
intelligence transformation therein.
BIOGRAPHY

Dr. John D. Winkler

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
Manpower and Personnel

John D. Winkler was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel) on 6 August 2001. He serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs for all National Guard and Reserve manpower, personnel and compensation policies; including Reserve component manpower requirements and utilization, personnel programs and management, the official Reserve component personnel database and system, Reserve medical readiness and programs, and development of legislation affecting guard and Reserve manpower, personnel and compensation.

Dr. Winkler was previously a Senior Behavioral Scientist at RAND and Associate Director of the Manpower and Training Program at the RAND Arroyo Center, a federally funded research and development center for the U.S. Army. As such, he managed and directed studies addressing personnel management, readiness and resources, individual and unit training, and the Army Reserve Components. He also served as the Arroyo Center’s liaison officer, assisting the Director of the Arroyo Center and serving as the point of contact for the Army regarding research program development and execution and results of policy studies. He has authored and co-authored numerous RAND publications.

Dr. Winkler has a Ph.D. in Social Psychology from Harvard University and a B.A. (with honors) in Psychology and Anthropology from the University of Pennsylvania.
Good morning. It is my pleasure to begin this morning’s panel discussion on Reserve Component Intelligence Transformation Needs and Opportunities and explore some of the efforts our Service Reserve Components are undertaking to meet tomorrow’s challenges. Similar to their active-duty counterparts, the Reserve Components are making visionary transformational changes today in order to be ready to defeat the adversary of tomorrow.

I think to begin the discussion of service-specific transformation efforts, it is useful to discuss transformation itself and what we mean by that term. Transformation has become a buzzword with many meanings, depending upon who the speaker is and the context in which it is used. For our discussion, I will define transformation simply as change to meet future challenges. In that context it becomes a service-specific issue of how best to make this change in order to meet future service missions.

Whether you choose to use a broad, or very specific, definition of transformation, military transformation is clearly a top priority with Secretary Rumsfeld. He has pointed out on numerous occasions that we must strive to change our culture, outlook, training and organizations in order to meet the challenges of future conflict. We need to get lighter, more lethal, and be more highly mobile in order for the United States to continue its preeminence in military capabilities.

In his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has called the current process of change the “most significant transformation of our military forces in many decades.” He has pointed out that we are seeing transformational forces in today’s civilian economy that increase the speed and effectiveness with which industrial and commercial tasks can be accomplished. These efforts drive advances in technology, computing, communicating, and networking which in turn are driving the advances in the military arts.

One example of this leveraging of commercial communication network technology that Mr. Wolfowitz likes to cite is the case of young NCOs, in Afghanistan, routinely integrating multiple intelligence-collection platforms by simultaneously coordinating what amounts to several chat rooms. This “innovative” thinking displays the agility with technology that comes from being “comfortable” with new ways of doing things.

But we need to recognize that the agility that we need to continue meeting threats at home and abroad depends on more than just technology, although that must be a fundamental part of our effort. It is tied also to changing our organizational designs and
embracing new concepts. In fact, Secretary Rumsfeld has stated his desire for a change in culture that will encourage innovation and prudent risk-taking.

The military intelligence community is an integral part of this cultural change. To advance this change, the SECDEF, with congressional support, created the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to help guide and implement transformational strategies that will help our Defense intelligence organizations become as technologically and organizationally agile as the NCO in Mr. Wolfowitz’s example.

The intelligence field has expanded well beyond the traditional focus of an intelligence officer relying on message traffic and preparing a briefing to a commander. Today’s intelligence professional is an “operator” who operates ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) weapons systems just as his counterpart operators are flying attack aircraft, operating a tank or conducting operations aboard ship. Intelligence operators are integral to the development of missile defense, space-based radar, unmanned combat aerial vehicles, precision and miniature munitions for attacking deep underground facilities, mobile targets, and targets in dense urban areas.

Intelligence operators are part of the mix that is currently leveraging information technology so we can pass targeting data any time and anywhere U.S. forces may operate. These same individuals are also key players in conducting effective space and information operations that utilize these technologies.

A key part of this intelligence transformation is to encourage our future senior leaders to think about war in the future. We need to change the environment to where we can encourage and reward those who seek to “lean forward” in order to develop innovative, and sometimes radical, approaches to tomorrow’s conflicts. Mr. Rumsfeld has outlined his desires for a “force that is adapted to the future, not the past.” He has stated that we “need people who are capable of operating highly technical activities and providing the kind of leadership that is distinctive in our country and some other democracies.” It is against this background that the Air Force has begun its transformation of the intelligence career field.

To understand how Air Force Intelligence is transforming, we must look to see how it fits into the Air Force transformation strategy as a whole. Secretary Roche has framed the need for transformation this way:

The successes of recent air operations are showing potential enemies that air and space power can achieve swift victory for America, regardless of distance, terrain or adversary. But those successes have brought forth new challenges.
We face a new reality; one in which our traditional defenses may be of limited effect. This new reality highlights the absolute necessity of transforming our air and space capabilities.

Secretary Roche concluded that

Transformation is one of our principal missions. By transformation, we mean to provide the strategies, systems, training and support required to affect the strategic environment in which we find ourselves.

This means that the Air Force must develop doctrinal approaches appropriate to the new era and where necessary, retool approaches to organizing and employing forces.

Our future force will employ multi-mission aircraft systems with multi-spectral, fused air and space sensors and robust, all-weather weapons delivery with increased standoff capability. We will network these systems in ways that will enable us to find, fix, track, target, engage and assess adversaries in timelines not achievable just a few years ago. The goal is an Air Force that has precise, persistent ISR capabilities to achieve information dominance for the joint warfighter.

To that end the Air Force is already fielding or developing several systems that will meet Secretary Roche’s goal: multi-mission command and control aircraft, new airborne radar, and an entire generation of unmanned aerial vehicles, including Global Hawk, armed scout Predators and hunter/killer UAVs, and the F/A-22. In each of these examples, intelligence will play key roles in planning and employment of these new systems. New opportunities and challenges for intelligence professionals are abundant.

General John Jumper, the Air Force Chief of Staff, is also a champion of transformation. His focus is to leverage the nation’s technology and the capabilities that the Air Force brings to the fight — stealth, precision, standoff, information technology and space — to create asymmetrical advantages against an aggressor.

General Jumper points out that transformation will also rely on tying the information gathered from various ISR assets into an advanced command and control network. He notes that this network is one area where the Air Force will be pursuing radical changes such as the horizontal integration of manned, unmanned and space platforms. The Air Force will combine the persistence of airborne platforms, manned and unmanned, with the high ground of space in the right proportion to make sure this horizontal integration can work. This effort will be intelligence intensive and will require the seamless integration of our active duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve intelligence operators to be effective.

To prepare the Air Force “ISR Total Force” to operate in this environment of change, the Air Force looked at training and career development as one of the first places to change our culture.

Implementing Gen. Jumper’s vision of Predictive Battlespace Awareness, or PBA, also requires us to change our methods of training and intelligence force development. PBA results from the integration of Target Development; Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlespace; ISR Strategy, Planning and Employment; and Assessment into a coherent framework that maximizes the capabilities of our C2 and ISR assets. PBA will establish an efficient framework that will enable commanders to predict and preempt adversary actions.

To create an intelligence culture keen on predicting adversary intent and probable courses of action, the Air Force has initiated an overhaul of both the officer and enlisted career development paths. We are using training, education, assignment management and professional development to improve the expertise within our five intelligence core competencies to create a level of PBA understanding within all echelons of our force. To do this, we structured our program to train and develop our professionals with the right levels of experience appropriate for the phases of their careers during the 1-9-year, 9-15-year and 15-25-year points.

In the initial 1-9-year phase, training and education focus on the basic PBA processes and methods, with standard core modules relating to our core competencies of 1) Targeting; 2) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace; 3) ISR Campaign Planning and Execution; 4) Air Operations Center and Unit Operations; and 5) Force Protection, along with other multi-discipline requirements. Following initial intelligence training, we complement the broad-based skills learned with a course focused on the individual’s initial assignment. We created the Intelligence Formal Training Units as the primary source for training intelligence operators on a particular weapons system or mission area’s needs. Our emphasis, in this first career phase, is on giving intelligence operators experience in how we operate at the tactical level. During this phase, intelligence operators should have at least one assignment at the tactical unit level, two assignments in leadership positions and one assignment in staff positions at higher headquarters or national level. We also encourage attendance at the Joint Military Intelligence College, Air Force Institute of Technology, Junior Officer Cryptologic Career Program and other Advanced Academic Degree programs in this initial career phase.

Our Intelligence Professional Development also starts in phase one. We have developed an Intelligence Expert Skills Course for personnel at the four to seven-year points. This course enhances acquired skills and extends knowledge of the PBA core specialty domains. Combined with professional development, we want our operators to begin broadening so they can be fully certified in at least three Air Force intelligence core competencies before reaching the next level.

Our next phase, at the nine to fifteen-year point, builds upon level one by expanding experience in the core areas. In career phase two, ISR operators will receive additional credentialed training in ISR operations; IPB, Targeting; Information Operations; or Air Defense Command and Control Warfare and should avail themselves of advanced education opportunities if they have not already done so. We have also established an Intelligence Master Skills Course to expand Senior Captains and Majors’ intelligence core competency knowledge levels and to prepare them for intelligence leadership positions. In this phase, personnel will continue their broadening with joint-duty assignments, special duty assignments and other leadership opportunities.
Our third phase, or level three, for those with fifteen to twenty-five years of service, leverages the expertise, experience and background of our senior-level personnel to maximize their contribution to Air Force missions. We have adopted a proactive force development and assignment approach so we can select the right people for leadership positions. In this phase we build on the experience requirements of the preceding levels and joint assignment experience. During this phase officers will serve in senior leadership positions such as A2, J2, Major Command Senior Intelligence Officer, Director, or Commander; and enlisted professionals should serve as an Operations Superintendent at an Intelligence Unit.

We plan to develop a seminar program, the “Senior Intelligence Leadership Seminar” for senior intelligence officers, enlisted, and civilian professionals in their third career phase which will further sharpen their knowledge of PBA concepts and ISR operations.

Although I have not mentioned Professional Military Education in each intelligence career phase, intelligence professionals will be required to complete the appropriate level of PME for their grade at the appropriate time in their careers. Our career development path, coupled with PME and technical military training, will provide the Air Force with broadly skilled professionals who have the knowledge and experience to be adaptive, innovative, and to be flexible in future combat operations.

Implementing this intelligence career transformation strategy has been challenging within the Air Force active-duty force. It will be equally challenging for our Air Reserve Components. However, both the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserves have embraced the challenges of transformation and are committed to being full partners in developing a comparable transformation strategy that will meet the Air Force’s future requirements as well as their own.

This leads us into a discussion of how important our Reserve Intelligence Components are in the Total Force and what future innovations, visions, and opportunities are on the horizon for Guard and Reserve Intelligence professionals.

The Air Force has relied on Air Reserve Component units and capabilities as an essential part of day-to-day operations for many years. In the past two years the Global War on Terrorism and Operation Iraqi Freedom have brought that reliance to new heights.

Lt. General Daniel James III, Director of the Air National Guard, is committed to the ANG’s being a “modernized and available force” for national emergencies and a key part of Air Force transformation. He is looking at the Guard to expand its involvement in the full spectrum of traditional missions as well as new missions including space, information warfare, information management, and unmanned aerial vehicle operations. The ANG is also integrating into daily Air Force operations in new ways in areas such as the Joint Surveillance, Target-Attack Radar System where Guard and active-duty personnel have been “blended” into a unit where active-duty and ANG personnel work side-by-side on a daily basis. This is a good example of what Dr. Winkler talked about.

This same close integration is occurring within other parts of Air Force intelligence total force operations. Today, the Guard has four squadrons providing intelligence
operators to the Distributed Common Ground Systems (DCGS) in addition to providing support to Space, Imagery and Signals missions. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, ANG NCOs quickly integrated into Imagery Mission Supervisor positions at DGS 1 and 2, located at Langley and Beale Air Force Bases. Guard personnel provided reporting on about 25 percent of enemy order-of-battle reporting, including about one-third of the SAM, Surface-to-Surface Missiles, and ground equipment. Clearly, Guard personnel have become integral partners in on-going Air Force ISR operations.

Distributed, reach-back intelligence production conducted by the Air Force DCGS is an ideal role for the Air National Guard. Their participation in DCGS operations mitigates Air Force active-duty operator shortfalls, leverages existing infrastructure, and supports steady-state and surge requirements in either garrison or in a deployed mode. They can provide greatly expanded capabilities at low cost by employing part-time manpower to satisfy full-time requirements.

Although there are still challenges to be worked in manpower, sustainment funding, end-strength ceilings, and additional training slots, these challenges will be met and the payoff to Air Force capabilities and the nation will be great.

The other key is that our ISR total force contributes integral capabilities through both units and the Reserve’s Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs). Air Reserve units provide the same level of aviation support and expertise that the Air Guard provides to flying operations; and the Reserve IMA program embeds high-caliber Reserve intelligence expertise at our active-duty units, commands and joint organizations.

Resources and training will continue to be challenges for the Reserves as in the Air Guard. The Reserves are addressing recruiting and retention of IMAs/Unit Personnel/Traditional Reservists and technicians within its intelligence programs. AFRC’s new future missions offer exciting opportunities and challenges which will be attractive to many former active-duty members separating from the military. Capturing the expertise and experience of these professionals will always be a key core component of our reserve recruitment.

Air Force ISR total force intelligence professionals are facing the challenges of transformation by adapting to new missions and training. Our approach to total force transformation is NOT a top-down, active-duty dictated, approach. It is a collegial approach that capitalizes on the core expertise of active-duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve Command cultures. The environment we currently face is rapidly changing, evolving, and expanding and will require “out of the box thinking.” The Air Reserve Components are meeting this challenge by fully integrating with the active-duty forces to provide a spectrum of capability that will continue to meet our nations future combat ISR needs.

As the Department of Defense transforms its military capabilities into a lighter, more lethal and highly mobile force, as envisioned by Secretary Rumsfeld, ISR professionals will continue to transform by attracting and training quality people, adapting new technologies and integrating new missions into the ISR total force. We are confident that the skills, expertise, experience and innovative ideas of our Air Force ISR total force will continue to meet the challenges and demands of a changing global environment.
BIOGRAPHY

Kenneth K. Dumm
Associate Director for Intelligence
Directorate of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations
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Kenneth K. Dumm, a member of the Senior Intelligence Executive Service, is Associate Director for Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC. In this position, he is the principal adviser to the Director of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance in the areas of intelligence planning and programming, resources and budget, production and application, force management, and intelligence security matters. He has responsibility for programmatic and budget matters for the Air Force National Foreign Intelligence Program, intelligence portions of the Air Force Program Objective Memorandum, and acts as senior U.S. Air Force executive for these programs with Congress, the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community.

Mr. Dumm served as an officer in the U.S. Air Force from 1973 until he retired in 2000. While on active duty, he was a master navigator on B-52s before transitioning to the intelligence career field. He commanded a flying squadron and the National Air Intelligence Center, and served on the staff of Headquarters Electronic Security Command at Headquarters Air Force Intelligence Command and Headquarters U.S. Air Force. His decorations include the Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters, Air Force Commendation Medal, and Air Force Achievement Medal.

Mr. Dumm was appointed to the SIES in 2000.
Good morning. I am going to take fifteen minutes and tell you a little about the Reserve Intelligence Test Program; I want to introduce you to the issues that we have identified, and the recommendations that are currently being forwarded through DIA as a draft. This is a draft report. We have briefed the Director and key individuals within DIA, but it has not yet left the building. If you will, please, don’t take this out and publish it as if it was a done deal.

After the first Gulf War, the Defense Intelligence Agency began a review of the lessons learned of that activity, and they also looked at the reserve components’ intelligence functions and their contributions to the active-duty force. The outcome of this was the 1995 OSD memo, which addressed the peacetime use of reserve and intelligence elements. That particular piece identified a number of barriers and obstacles that confronted the reserve component intelligence program. In 2000, legislation was passed and the effort was underway by the spring of 2001 for the Secretary of Defense to conduct a three-year test, and that is indeed the test that I was brought on last year to help push forward. This test was to assess the efficiency of the current structure and the use of reserve component intelligence. The Director was appointed to serve as a test director for this particular program.

At the same time, you will remember in the spring of 2001 the SECDEF was initiating a number of similar efforts in transformation across DoD. You are hearing about some of them today and Colonel Crone will speak later about the concept behind “Continuum of Service.” Many of our endeavors are coming to fruition right now as we speak—all at about the same time. So if you hear a number of studies that sound similar it is because they are the same issues driving the same conclusions. It is interesting how we can use these studies together to build momentum to get some of these very difficult issues through Congress or DoD.

Our study was chaired by the Office of the Under Secretary for Defense Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence and consisted of an oversight panel of twelve general flag officers and civilian equivalents. Although they were mostly reserves, we tried and did get some active-duty involvement in the activity. Each one of those flag officers was assigned an action officer, and I am happy to tell you many of the flags and several of
the action officers are in this room today. The legislation called for three reports, one was to be done in July 02, one in July 03, and the final report in Dec of 04. The first was issued on time and it laid a baseline for our study. I am not sure there were a whole lot of new ideas in that first report. The second one, the draft that we’re preparing right now, is nearly final. The reports, as you can imagine, have taken a number of twists and turns. Remember, the spring of 2001 was followed shortly thereafter by September the 11th. At that point, they tried to decide whether or not they wanted to continue because resources were limited. We all, particularly my team, relied on service contributions to man the team. The members of the Oversight Panel decided that there was no better opportunity to address the mobilization issues we were to discuss than after September 11th.

The resource problem surfaced after Afghanistan and then just last January, at our last oversight panel meeting, when we were all getting ready to march off to Iraq. So there has been another cycle of ups and downs, fits and groans, and in January, when Iraq was looming large and taking much-needed resources and causing tension— for our active and reserve intelligence chiefs— the Oversight Panel decided to make the July 2003 report our final report. This is not to say that this work is incomplete. I would tell you that it is really just now beginning to start...and this is some of what is going on in this effort.

We are trying to grab some low-hanging fruit during this particular study. There are over two dozen different issues that were brought up, discussed, kicked around and reviewed. We took those two dozen and we tried to center them on four or five basic issues. The following are the issues, and the subject of findings and subsequent recommendations: Force Structure, Flexible Capabilities, Skills Accessibility (database), and Remote Intelligence Support.

Issue number one: Are the reserve components optimally organized and structured to meet the service-related intelligence requirements of DoD? None of the findings will be a surprise to those of you who have been working with reserve intelligence issues, but we will briefly review them. Filling the billets of the combatant commanders and the combat service agencies is extremely difficult. It is a complex, restrictive structure, as we heard this morning. There are some three-dozen different duty statuses. Each one of the duty statuses has different entitlements; whether it’s health insurance, leave accrual, medical allowances, or pay. There are also service barriers that limit the use of reserves in active-duty roles. There is a shortage of skilled personnel, and each service interprets the regulations differently.

The example of the mobilized reservist was one of the points brought up particularly at some of the joint commands — the European Command the Pacific Command. They say once you get a reservist there, you may have two people of the same rank sitting next to each other, doing the same work, but they are from different services. Unfortunately, one is getting different pay and allowances. That may not be a big service issue, but the combatant commanders are spending an inordinate amount of time tending to human-resource issues, and that was the difficulty, they told us.

Secondly, one of the findings was that the current mobilization manpower plans are based on theories of forty or more years ago. They are not particularly effective and they
are not really suiting the needs of the combatant commanders and the Combat Support Agencies (CSAs). The Component Commands and the CSAs have limited control of their reserve component intelligence personnel, and in a lot of cases these come out of individual services not necessarily assigned to them. They (Combatant Commanders) talk about the inability to have administrative and operational control over some of these assets, particularly when they are as reservists drilling at their reserve site. In the reserves, the remote intelligence centers themselves are operated and owned by different services, and managed by different services. For example, at one, the Navy may be a very high player, and the Army and Navy are operating at an Army facility where Army is primarily focused toward training and Navy at that particular time is looking only at contributory support. All those interrelationships have been worked out on a handshake, a wink, a nod and in some cases, Memorandums of Agreement. It wasn’t really an efficient way to use the Joint Reserve Intelligence Center (JRIC) structure.

Finally, the finding in this particular issue was that production is difficult to quantify and measure. One of things that I found out about in the short time that I have been up here is that everything is driven by money and the numbers count. So at the end of the day when they are talking about investing money into connectivity, or equipment at the JRIC, they are looking for production. What have you done for me? Put it on paper — let me see the numbers. There is no quantifiable type of measurement.

These will be the recommendations: continuum service, standardized mobilization process, and demobilization process too. We are struggling with that right now as we speak. Some other issues include proposing legislative changes: peacetime crises, contingency and wartime — all have some legal connotations.

We no longer “turn it on and turn it off” anymore. It is a continuum. Perhaps one of our most controversial initiatives is that we have proposed to test a joint reserve intelligence unit—a true joint intelligence unit, with the funding, the organizational and administrative structure, the operational control, fitness reports, and evaluations. We have several notional types of reserve units. One is over at the Pentagon in J2. In fact, the commanding officer from that particular unit, an Admiral-select, is here today. The idea would be to make that a true joint unit, where there is some administrative control. That was the only way we could get our foot in the door because there is a little service pushback to this—the services are reluctant to lose administrative control. There are worries, not necessarily, about career management of their reservists assigned to the joint unit. We plan to do a twelve-month test, see how it goes and do a “lessons-learned” at the end. If it is worthwhile and this is something that our joint command commanders are asking for. Then perhaps you initiate another couple, three or five. Not all the reserves need to be associated or involved in a joint reserve unit. Perhaps it would benefit a place like EUCOM to have a reserve unit that is truly joint, one that they can put in their deliberate planning process for mobilization.

An additional recommendation is to implement a mechanism to document report output. There is a lot of off-the-shelf stuff right now. One way or another we have to start measuring whether it is perfect or not. We have to start measuring the contribution of the
reserves and reserve intelligence support because if we don’t, the active-duty side believes that they don’t see it. Somebody wants to see it before they dedicate money to it.

There are a few final issues. What can be done to recruit, train, and retain personnel in the reserve intelligence community? There are critical skills shortages—linguists, imagery analysts (everybody talks about them—that certainly jumped out). More findings were that policies and requirements limited training opportunities. Imagery analysis training is another one, language is another. There are training opportunities for active-duty personnel that are not necessarily available for reservists, certainly not in the numbers you need in order to fill a need during a mobilization process. And hats off to the Navy! They just completed one of the first reserve imagery training classes at Dam Neck, Virginia. They graduated 17 or so brand new imagery analysts.

Then there are the differences between the active-duty and reserve status, and the need to simplify the process. The recommendations associated with this particular issue go back to the continuum of service idea that allows us to get some of that flexibility to bring on that reservist who is a Farsi speaker, who knows how to ride a camel and also has some experience capping oil wells. He may be an Exxon employee pulling down a pretty big salary. He yearns to make a military contribution but is not available when required. Exxon would love to have him participate too, but only on an “as needed” basis. When an event happens like we’ve just gone through, then everybody is ready and willing and able and they march off and want to do the job. So if we develop a system which allows us to put him on a retainer, if you will, it doesn’t mean he has to drill twelve months of the year or do two weeks active duty, but if he’s able to stay in the wings so we can pull him off a bench when we need him, that’s sort of the flexibility that I am hoping that the continuum of service issue will address.

There are modularized training opportunities; there needs to be more that are particularly adapted for the reservists who can do a thirteen-week course perhaps over a year, or a year and a half. Another late addition to this particular one was to increase the compensation for particular skills—highly needed, low-density skills—and that would be for linguists. For a linguist, whether on active duty or in the reserves, work is required to maintain that proficiency whether you are drilling two days or you’re working thirty days.

Collecting and categorizing a skills database—this has already been mentioned in the keynote address. There is no single database. Each one of the services has their own and they are all different. They are not necessarily interoperable with the combatant commanders or the combat service agencies. They cannot necessarily look for and find the particular talented reservist they want. In a lot of cases, who sits in the reserve seat—whether he is Army, Air Force, or Navy—is very reliant on who you know. As to whom that particular combatant commander may get, the individual may not be well qualified. In any event, there is no skills database at present.

Are remote intelligence centers (JRICs) optimally configured to take care of our needs? The findings show that some of this is being addressed now, as we are seeing more operational (“ops”) officers at some of these joint reserve intelligence units. We have seen
that the joint reserve intelligence units operate best when they have full-time support to take care of the equipment, the manning, the connectivity when the reservists come in from all services, and when there is a customer investment, meaning the particular gaining command or the combatant commander who has assets there. The Joint Forces Command has done this. They have sent an individual to a particular site and in this case the one I am most familiar with was Detroit, where that person was a liaison between the production departments of the commands. The reservist came in and did production that was being coordinated with the command at the time. We see that there is higher productivity and effectiveness when you have full-time support at these joint reserve intelligence units.

Other findings were that there is no mechanism to ensure that the JRICs are leveraged to provide remote reachback. They are not necessarily included in the combatant commander’s joint deliberate contingency plans; in other words, their mobilization opportunities are lacking. We have been using joint reserve intelligence units in this role to a certain extent. Has it been enough, or to the extent we could have? Probably not. Will it be different next time around? Probably so, because a lot of people have gotten used to having remote intelligence. Some of them are better equipped to provide combat support than the customer. The equipment at some of these places is excellent. There are twenty-seven JRICs. The equipment, and the investment that’s in place there is excellent.

We continue to encourage the use of full-time support staff whether it is from DIA, from the reserve intelligence detachment, or whether it is from the services or from the gaining commands. Full-time support from each one of these sites really invigorates a particular center. We want to include the JRICs in future operational control plans and establish them as Centers of Excellence. You may have particular JRICs located in areas that are suited for a specific mission, such as the NAIC at Wright-Patterson Air Force base with its MASINT Capability. That could be a MASINT Center of Excellence. Birmingham is the same way—Fort Worth—those are examples of Centers of Excellence.

Another Center of Excellence might be a geographic area—Fort Sheridan and Fort Gillem are both European Command players. They represent another Center of Excellence— in fact I will cite this for you—in Fort Worth starting last Monday, there is a Continuity of Operations (COOP) test that is going on at present. It is the second half of the test. JRICs are suited to do COOP. The Joint Intelligence Center-Pacific brought out ten reservists from all over the country, not just Fort Worth. They took them out to Hawaii for two weeks—they learn, they train, they did the walks, they performed the mission. Now they are being reconstituted in Fort Worth to actually do product and write mission and intelligence summaries, and perform other intelligence functions out of Fort Worth. So if the big Tsunami comes along in Hawaii and wipes the place out—God forbid—then you have some place where you can fly people off the island to continue the work of JICPAC. You can reconstitute reservists at that particular facility and the mission and the intelligence work goes on.
BIOGRAPHY

Captain Ward T. Wilson, USNR

Project Manager
Secretary of Defense Reserve Intelligence Test Program Office

Captain Ward T. Wilson was selected in March 2002 as Project Manager for the Congressionally mandated Secretary of Defense Reserve Intelligence Test Program Office at the Defense Intelligence Agency. He manages a senior group of Service/Reserve intelligence leaders and officials from the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commands, and Combat Service Agencies. This team is charged with determining the most appropriate ways to use the Reserve Component intelligence forces to support current and future needs of the warfighter.

Captain Wilson graduated from Rhodes College (formerly Southwestern at Memphis) in Memphis, Tennessee, and attended Aviation Officer Candidate School in Pensacola, Florida, where he earned a commission in September 1979. On active duty, he served as Aviation Intelligence Officer for Attack Squadron 75 aboard the USS Saratoga (CV-60) in the Mediterranean and later completed an Indian Ocean/Mediterranean cruise embarked on the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67). While serving as Executive Assistant to the Scientific Advisory Committee of the Defense Intelligence Agency, he was a White House Social Aide to President Ronald Reagan. Subsequently, he was assigned to the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Intelligence Center for the Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Forces Europe in London, and was involved in operations associated with the SS Achille Lauro, TWA Hijacking, and various Libyan Operations, and he served as a Special Assistant to the CINC in Naples, Italy.

After detaching from active duty in 1987, Captain Wilson affiliated with the Naval Reserve Intelligence Program and served in units in Ohio and Kentucky. He was recalled to active duty as Assistant Intelligence Officer to Commander Joint Task Force Middle East on board the USS Coronado operating in the Persian Gulf, where he participated in Operations EARNEST WILL and PRAYING MANTIS. After returning to his unit in Louisville, he served with units in Columbus and as Executive Officer of Atlantic Intelligence Command 1673 in Detroit, Michigan, and as Commanding Officer of Joint Forces Intelligence Command 0486. In October 2000, he was assigned as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (N2) for the Commander, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command, Fort Worth, Texas.

Captain Wilson's personal decorations include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Navy Commendation Medal and Navy Achievement Medal.

In civilian life, Captain Wilson is the President of the Kentucky/Indiana Automotive Wholesalers Association and represents more than 545 members in the automotive aftermarket in the two-state region on various legislative and trade issues.
It's a delight to be here. I am going to talk to you about Joint Officer management and Joint Personnel and Administration. Looking at the array of uniforms out here, I see I have the right audience. Dr. Winkler was talking about doing a great long study in a short period of time under pressure to report to the Secretary, and he gave you my introduction. Our product was—as all studies are—a great tome. You will be happy to know that there is an executive summary. You will be even happier to know that you can get that in electrons.

It's really fascinating listening to CAPT Ward Wilson. The law that we studied applied almost entirely in the active component and so the focus of our study was largely on the active component but to the degree that we addressed the reserve component, we looked at many of the things that CAPT Wilson’s folks looked at and we said many of the same things.

I'm going to talk about why we did the study and what we found out. But I want to spend a minute, first of all, to address this issue of joint officer management, and of joint professional military education. A lot of people have heard the terms, but do not know much about the issues. We did this study because Congress required the Secretary of Defense to have it done as part of the Defense Authorization Act of 2002. Booz-Allen Hamilton won the contract. The Contracting Officers Representative was in the J-1 of the Joint Staff. But we had many clients, people to whom we reported and we reported formally to the Senate Armed Service Committee, the House Armed Services Committee and the Joint Staff Offices of the Secretary of Defense. The study was complex and ambitious, reactive, and included many things.

Now, here is the idea that I want to talk about: The first point is that joint officer management and joint professional military education are a matter of law. They are part of the Goldwater/Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986 and are considered a very important pillar of that reform in the Department of Defense. A lot of people do not realize that. First of all, the GNA is a very detailed and very complicated law. In Chapters 36 and 38, Title 10, there is little wiggle room on how to address the rules of joint officer management and joint personnel and administration. To make exceptions literally requires an act of Congress. Now, why is that the case? The reason for that is that in 1986 the GNA
culminated a long string of reform efforts in the United States, both by military people and civilian people going all the way back to the War in Vietnam, but continuing through some of the difficulties of the 1970s—the Iran hostage rescue mission, the Beirut Bombing of the Marine barracks—and just a lot of angst that the military basically was not working. So with a lot of effort they passed a law that says we are going to do this differently.

The law established principally that, un-ambiguously, the Secretary is in charge of the whole Department of Defense and that includes departments and service secretaries. The second thing it established was that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the nation’s senior military officer. He is in charge—he is not in command. The Secretary of Defense is in command—but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, and to the Secretary of Defense, and he is the senior leader in charge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The rest of those guys are important—they play a role and are powerful figures—but they work for somebody and the person they work for is the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The third thing that it said is that all of our military forces are under the command of the combatant commanders as they are today. And they are not under the Command of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and so on. Those guys provide forces to the combatant commanders. The chain of command goes to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the combatant commander, and down to the forces.

Now, in order to give the Chairman and the combatant commanders the authority and the power that goes with the implied responsibility, they had to get their fair share of good folks and we interviewed every living former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the exception of Secretary Powell who said he just could not get on our calendar, which we understood. But at any rate, all these people told us that a free-floating game will always revert to the services, not because the services are bad, but because it is in the nature of the services to send their best people to service assignments first. And that is what was happening through the fifties, sixties, seventies, and eighties and that’s what they wanted to change. So they said we are going to pass a law that will compel the services to “fair share” their best people to joint assignments. You don’t make flag [rank] in any of the services unless you have had a joint assignment. Oh, by the way, the services do not get to decide what the joint assignment is—the Secretary of Defense will decide what the joint assignments are. And that’s how you get this thing called the Joint Duty Assignment List that is the validated list that the Service Secretaries sign off on. He says those are the joint assignments that will qualify a person to become a flag officer. Joint officer management, and the education to which it is tied, is a single interwoven system established under law to provide quality, experienced, trained officers to joint commanders and to the Secretary of Defense and the combat support agencies.

Under joint officer management there are two key things. I’ve mentioned one—that an active-duty officer has to have one of these assignments to make flag. There are also Joint Specialty Officers, and those are people who have served in repeated joint duty assignments and specialize in joint matters which are also defined in law. And then there are two levels of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), and the concept of overall Professional Military Education (PME). An officer gets JPME-I by going to the
intermediate-level Service college. It’s automatic that all officers get it at the intermediate level and the purpose of JPME-I is simply to orient and to inform officers about a joint assignment that may be in their future. There is a second level, JPME-II. It is only given at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk right now. It is the second level of Joint education and that prepares one to be a Joint Specialty Officer. Do you have to be a Joint Specialty Officer to be a flag? Absolutely not. But to ensure that the services make and send a fair share of their best officers to be Joint Specialty Officers, people who become Joint Specialty Officers are tracked for promotion, and they have to be promoted at a rate comparable to their peers. And the purpose of that is not to disadvantage an officer for having served outside of his or her service. However, a lot of people who hear these terms don’t understand what they mean or why they were instituted in the first place; all they know is all the difficult rules.

I will go through each one of these programs. We will move on to some specific reserve component things, and I hasten to add here and should have said in my introductory remarks: We did this under contract, or our corporation did. I am not speaking for my client here; I am not speaking for the Department of Defense and not speaking for Booz-Allen Hamilton. I am leveling with you and telling you Paul Herbert’s personal opinion as a consequence of experience in all the above. We think we ought to implement an officer management program for reserve component officers in accordance with “DoD Instruction 1215.20.” In my personal opinion is it is a very austere instruction. There was an addendum posted to chapter 38 of Title 10 that says the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish a joint officer management program analogous to all the other sections in Title 10 for reserve component officers. They met the technical requirements of that law by publishing DoD I 1215.20. But in my personal opinion, all the DoD instruction does is to state that there will be such a program and the services will run it. There is nothing, or very little, there. And that leads to some of the difficulties we have with these Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRICs), where the people in them are all managed by a different set of rules.

Next, the reserve-component JPME certainly increases the number of reserve component officers that go to phase two at the Joint Forces Staff College. That’s a ninety-day TDY school. It does not have a non-resident version and that is a matter of law. Now, many people — and that is a contentious issue — a lot of people have said “if its only 90 days, can I do 45 of those days online and show up for the exam and the exercise.” In an ideal world, that may be a perfectly good idea; certainly one very attractive to the reserve component, but part of the idea of the 90-day school is to make it an intensive, face-to-face experience — the sustained face-to-face experience among officers of different services to learn to know and understand, trust and respect each other — in addition to just knowing what is in the joint doctrinal manuals. We think the JPME-I, which is that part of joint professional military education that everybody gets at the intermediate level, ought to be required before a person serves in a joint-duty assignment.

There is the Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) list which is for active-duty personnel, and there is also a Joint Duty Assignment Reserve (JDAR), which is not intensively managed; there are positions in joint headquarters to be filled by reservists that are analogous to
those positions on the JDA list. We think JPME-1 ought to be a requirement — require reserve component officers selected for assignment to Joint Task Forces to have completed the appropriate level of JPME for the position to which they are assigned. One ongoing project looks at how we access reserve component capability, something that has been talked about by almost every speaker here. We grab people and stick them into *ad hoc* joint headquarters. A joint task force is a principal example of the fact that there are many of them. But there are types of *ad hoc* headquarters. A lot of folks have absolutely no orientation to do that. They are smart, capable people with the fundamental core skills that are required; intelligence communications or what have you. Most of them don’t have a clue about how a joint headquarters is organized, how it is supposed to operate, how it is different from a service headquarters that they might be familiar with, and so on, so we think that needs to be addressed in training.

The next issue is reserve component incentives. We think that the incentive structure of the reserve component is pretty much tailored to a post-World War II Cold War paradigm of how we use the reserve component mentioned here, mobilizing units and that entire sort of thing. And we have to look at the incentive structure to encourage individuals to acquire the skills that are necessary for both the joint training and the joint PME preparation for joint assignments. Some things that you are all concerned with we found when we interviewed people — we did go down to Norfolk and spent some hours with most of the O5s and O6s (lieutenant colonels and colonels) who are in the joint reserve unit that augments the Joint Forces Command headquarters. We also had teams that conducted interviews with all of the combatant commands and most of the combatant support agencies. We talked with a lot of reserve officers stationed there. We visited all the PME institutions, we had focus groups with students, and we talked with reservists there. Even though our focus was on the active component, a reserve perspective on this was not absent.

First of all, we are using the officer corps, active and reserve, differently as joint integration moves from the strategic levels of command at the combatant command level and national level, down to the operational, even the higher tactical level. That’s where we are synchronizing joint combat power. That’s where people have to have joint awareness, joint skills and orientation, but JPME is not structured to provide that and so the requirement for greater joint synchronization at lower hierarchical levels, lower tactical levels, puts a demand on our utilization and education and training of officers. Certainly there are more and more officers who are serving in these joint positions and many of them without the benefit of training or education or orientation. There is no requirement in current law for a reserve component officer to have a joint assignment for promotion to O-7. There may be *de facto* requirements from a competitive point of view, but there is no requirement as there is for the active component. But we see a time when joint experience and education is going to be increasingly important as a credential for promotion into the senior ranks of the military active and reserve.

Finally, the DoD Instruction says that this education and training of the reserve components is the responsibility of officials mentioned there. Some of the things that we thought DoD can probably look at in addition to all of the recommendations you’ve seen
includes the validation and documentation of these JDAR positions. Frankly, both in the active and reserve components there are a lot of pressures because you’ve got to have one of these assignments to make flag. Everybody and his brother wants to obtain these positions in their organizations, and so there is always this angst about whether it is a valid position. As one very senior person said to me with a great deal of frustration when I asked him, “what could be fixed about this system?” He says, “I’ll tell you what to fix.” He says, “[you] fix the fact I can’t promote one of my Colonels to flag after he commanded a joint task force for a year, but some guy who has been an executive assistant to an Assistant of the Secretary of Defense makes it because that is a joint position.” I don’t say that to stir up any jealousy or animosity or cast aspersions on the great people who hold those jobs. I held a job in the Pentagon one time and could be so compared. The point of the matter is that our understanding of what constitutes a joint experience and sufficient joint experience to rise to very senior levels in the profession — so that you can provide your leadership to the whole force — needs some examination. And our biggest recommendation to the department is that you’ve got to step back from this thing and take a much more strategic approach, before you go in for recommendations for individual improvement. Most of the recommendations that come out of the department are very narrowly based. People want relief from this inconvenient rule, and that inconvenient rule — they want this and they want that. They are not thinking along the lines of “why are these rules here in the first place, what purpose do they serve and how do we adjust them to the twenty-first century?”

We have discussed reserve component incentives and there are things that can be done there, and we think that for the Chiefs at the very top of the reserve components there ought to be some specified joint selection criteria. The fact of the matter is, senior leadership in the armed forces in the United States today is more and more is a function of how well you understand the emerging joint culture. Jointness is an emerging dimension of the profession of arms, and of the multi-national and inter-agency culture that is more and more central to how we operate, and to how we fight and win.
BIOGRAPHY

Dr. Paul Herbert
Booz-Allen Hamilton, Inc.

Dr. Paul Herbert is an Associate at Booz-Allen Hamilton, involved with the company’s support to the Joint Staff on strategic planning, future joint warfighting and professional military education. He received his doctoral degree in History from The Ohio State University and his bachelor of science degree from the United States Military Academy.

Prior to his retirement from the United States Army as a Colonel, Dr. Herbert served for thirty years as an infantry officer and held command and staff assignments in airborne, light, air assault, and mechanized infantry units worldwide. He served as a strategist in the Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) of the U.S. Joint Staff. He worked extensively on the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and directed the writing of the 1997 National Military Strategy of the United States. He supervised the updating of the U.S. Joint Strategic Planning System currently in effect. As a special assistant to the Director, J-5, Dr. Herbert led a team of strategists that conducted assessments and performed policy planning for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He worked extensively within the U.S. interagency environment and with the defense establishments of many foreign countries. Subsequently, he served as the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair at the National War College. He designed, directed and taught courses on U.S. interagency processes, national military strategy, joint warfighting, and the history of strategy and military theory. These covered the full spectrum of contemporary and emerging security matters including proliferation, missile defense, counterterrorism, homeland security, information warfare, space and peacekeeping. He assisted with security studies of South Asia and Turkey, both including in-country field studies. He also served as an Assistant Professor of History at the United States Military Academy and as Professor of Strategy at the National War College, Washington, DC. He has lectured on strategy and civil-military relations at the National War College; Naval War College; Georgetown University; U.S. Naval Academy; U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Marshall Center; Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Department of State; and the Kent School of the Central Intelligence Agency.

As a George C. Marshall Center Senior Fellow and Alumnus, Dr. Herbert has seven years of experience assisting new democracies with national strategic planning, including Poland, Hungary, Albania, the Republic of Georgia, and Kazakhstan, and he served as a member of the faculty of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany. He is the author of Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, a study of transformational Army doctrine after the Vietnam War published by the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has also published several articles on strategy, military affairs and military history.
PANELIST

Colonel Gary L. Crone, USAFR
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

I want to ask everybody to think about shifting his or her mind set, and I mean that literally. Turn off the right side of your brain and use the left side of your brain for the next few minutes here. I am going to ask you to indulge me a little bit in that respect.

All of you are forward “leaners” and forward thinkers and the idea of transformation—being able to think transformation—is not foreign to you. However, it is to a lot of people you work with, and so I want to deal with that first. We always talk about transformation and we get into all the issues. We have these big discussions about it, but we forget the environment in which this is occurring. I wanted to use this as an opportunity (for my own personal agenda) to try to implant in you thoughts about the atmosphere, the nature, and the nurturing of transformation and how it has to occur.

The first thing I wanted to mention is that problem-solving is not transformation. We have to understand that changing a butterfly into a tank; that’s transformation. Fixing a broken arm is not transformation; you get the same product when you are done when you fix that person’s arm. The first issue you are going to run into when you try to talk about transformation issues with anybody, your leadership, or your colleagues, is that they are going to start a typical conversation. They are relevant and important conversations that have to occur at some point, not necessarily at the time you may want them too. They’re going to want to know what’s the issue, what’s the problem, what’s the requirement and how often have we been down that road of discussion. Those discussions I would suggest to you are right brain discussions—the very analytical, the very analytically oriented. But what you end up doing is talking about processes versus new products. What you end up doing is talking about requirements versus new capabilities. What you end up doing is talking about trying to solve today’s problems and focusing on only today’s problems and forgetting about division. And that’s the second point; transformation produces capabilities that do not exist and reveals opportunities previously unimaginable.

In this vein, Dr. Winkler brought up the 179-day payroll, and this is a classic example. Today’s cornerstone is tomorrow’s stumbling block, and this is the current statutory structure paradigm of the reserve components. The 179-day payroll makes very good sense, for the people working the man-day issues. In the Air Force or any other service, it
Transformation: Nature vs. Nurture
(exercising the left side of your brain)

5 June 2003

Colonel Gary L. Crone, OASD/RA (M&P)

The Nature of Transformation

- Problem solving is not transformation.
- Transformation produces capabilities that did not exist and reveals opportunities that were previously unimaginable.
- Today's cornerstones are tomorrows stumbling blocks.
- Culture kills - 100% - all the time.

Institutions, by there very nature, resist change. They resist it in all all forms, whether good or bad.
The Nature of Transformation Creates an Atmosphere for Change

Under today's new HR strategy:

- Continuum of Service concepts challenge traditional thinking of RC categories and sub-categories
- Relevancy of RC categories can be challenged in same manner as duty statuses, roles and missions
- Access to civilian acquired skills is now recognized as a Reserve Component core competency
- IRR is being looked at as place for experimentation without directly impacting existing force structure

This is already happening with the active duty and with "seamless flow". If you do not engage you will be left behind.

Nature’s Themes

1. Create seamless flow between AC and RC during a military career
2. Establish new affiliation programs and encourage volunteerism
3. Simplify rules for accessing, employing, and separating reservists
4. Improve flexibility of compensation system
5. Enhance AC/RC career development

Complementary to P&R Human Resources Strategic Plan
makes a whole lot of sense because it is geared for keeping full-time people on duty or in training status. It isn’t geared for us to have people in the middle so you have these barriers and fixes in place to keep people where they are supposed to be under the paradigm. When the paradigm shifts and moves to a continuum of service, the new concept is of a day on duty and a day off duty. Now, all of sudden, issues that were the cornerstone of what you’re doing get in the way, and that’s part of what the continuum addresses. If you want to understand the significance of the power of continuum as a transformational tool, one thing I suggest is that you remember that with the continuum, its presumption is that all marks that you are putting on it when you are defining it or segmenting it — and you saw Dr. Winkler’s briefings — those marks are arbitrary. Just like the time continuum, if you are talking about time, it is arbitrary. What does a second or minute mean? It’s all arbitrary. Why is that powerful? Because when you’re going in, there’s an assumption that you wanted to make changes. You have to accept the fact that everything that went on before was also arbitrary. So then it becomes a case of comparative advantage; you don’t have to defend the status quo or defend where you are going. It just becomes a comparative advantage case.

The last point is that culture kills, one hundred percent, all the time, when it comes to transformation. Culture is the biggest hurdle to being able to transform. Now, in the context of the new human resources strategy in thinking about what we just briefly discussed, these are some of the things that are being challenged. If you look at the study that Dr. Winkler referenced and you look at it closely, you will see something very significant has occurred for the first time. Time out, I am going to caveat. I deal with things going on in my mind that are happening ten years from now, not today. Keep that in context. But it has led me to something very interesting: The regular reserve components, as we know them, are not fundamental building blocks for the continuum to work. I am not saying that they don’t have to exist for the continuum of service to continue to work, but what I am telling you is, for the first time, continuum is a concept that is not fundamentally tethered to or dependent on our understanding of a regular component and a reserve component. And I would say that in my opinion, the next debate occurs after we get the duty statuses correct, and after we learn to understand how to compress these duty statuses. Making it easier to get on or off duty is the next layer of the onion, which involves all these categories and sub-categories you have in the reserve component and the regular component. I would suggest that as the reserve component starts to look more and more like the active component, the corollary of this would be for the active component to begin to look like the reserve component. Eventually the discussion will be really about a total force integrated seamlessly, both operationally and administratively.

Now we are back to the slide that I promised Dr. Winkler I would put in. But I re-labeled it. In my mind, these are natural themes. These are the themes that he was talking about in the continuum. This is the nature of the transformation. These lanes in a road have been defined and transcribed, and in the second lane is where I am working.

This is sort of a litany of the areas of where we are looking — I am not going to read them, I am just going to let you look at them. There is a bullet missing about civilian occupation information. Dr. Winkler mentioned that. There are two sub/important parts to
that, one is near-term and one is long-term. The near-term one is the civilian employment information program, and we have a memorandum by Dr. Chu that now makes it mandatory for members of the ready reserve to report to their employer some basic information about the skills that they are currently performing. The second part is the long-term piece which is embedded into DIMHRS (Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System) which we are suggesting ought to be the direction for the long-term integration of a single manpower personnel and pay system. And under that rubric is what we are suggesting we need to be looking at — something called competency management, as opposed to skills management. Competency management in a very simplistic way is more resume-like as far as the data held there. It has knowledge of skills, and capabilities of individuals. We believe that will give us greater flexibility with new and emerging skills, repackaging and combining what people can and can not do. The end result of that is that if we pull on a person’s skills we not only get their active military skills, and their civilian skills — instead we get their capabilities.

Some of the concepts are already en route to implementation. One of these is the direct-entry Business Incentives Council (BIC) initiative. Under-Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Aldridge approved the concept, and I met last week with the executive director level of the BIC and got approval for the implementation plan. The first step for that would be an IPT (Implementation Planning Team) with the services. What this is all about is trying to map civilian skills to military skills and figure out where we will save or avoid training costs in the process of doing that. I will tell you that the biggest hurdle, I believe, is going to occur in this whole discussion — it is not a new discussion — most of you here have seen this debate occur. But I think it is ultimately going to come to a situation of training capabilities. If you are not talking large enough numbers, it makes sense to fold down a school or to change a school. If you can’t demonstrate that it is more cost-effective to bring folks in through the civilian skills, you are going to get pushed back from the schools that are providing these capabilities, then you have a certain cost in place and a certain number of bodies there for doing that and it isn’t cost effective. For the wireless engineer, the Defense Wireless Service Initiative is in place. We are trying to solve a problem where there is a requirement for these types of people in the field, and quite frankly most of the services are doing this as an additional duty. They don’t have separate MOSs or AFSCs (military occupational specialty, Air Force specialty codes) for that, and they sort of grow out of old skill sets. And you have a situation where the services are trying to do this with folks that at the E-3 or E-4 level, whereas in the civilian community they are making in the range $80,000 to $120,000 a year doing this. For somebody with that kind of expertise to decide to go into the Army, or Navy or Air Force and do twelve weeks of basic training and then be an E-3 or E-4 isn’t very enticing. So we are looking at trying to figure out new ways to get these folks to affiliate. To be quite frank: building on a lot of groundbreaking that was done in the SecDef plan for peacetime utilization of reserve component elements and the ideas of virtual training, connectivity, taking the requirements to where people are at, and trying to figure out new ways for them to affiliate and participate. Being able to do needed work, whether it is participating in the IRR (Individual Ready Reserve) or some other way, these are things that we are looking at. We are also putting on the table the service auxiliaries — a long-left-off piece. We
Establish new affiliation programs and encourage volunteerism

- **Controlled Specialty IRR** (temporary manpower pools)
  - Entry point into military of new pool of people (all ages)
  - With hard to grow/maintain skills or newly emerging skills
- **Direct Entry Programs** (mapping skills to MOSs/AFSCs)
  - To reduce/avoid training costs or to reduce accessions time
  - Similar to programs for lawyers, health care, chaplains, band
  - Patterned after Australian Defense Force Direct Entry Programs
- **Community Partnerships** (when cannot outsource 100%)
  - Working with communities, corporations, academia to provide certain skills/people to meet inherently military requirements that cannot be fully contracted out (can pull-back needed expertise into uniform)
- **Expanded/New Service Auxiliaries** (option for all Services)
  - Vehicles for civilian volunteers and retirees to support Service requirements (place for civilian surge volunteers)

Concepts En-route to Implementation

- **Direct Entry Business Incentives Council (BiC)** Initiative approved by Secretary Aldridge
- **Army Direct Entry IRR Program for Arab-Americans**
- **ASD/C3I Defense Wireless Service Initiative**
- **Community Partnerships**
  - AF/XPX and Dell exploring a sponsored reserve option
  - Information Assurance Scholarship program expanded
- **Expanded/new Service auxiliaries**
  - Transforming Civil Air Patrol to true Service Auxiliary
  - Expanding roles of Coast Guard Auxiliary

This is not a completed list. It can never be completed without your insights, inputs, and ideas.
seemed to rediscover them with Homeland Defense and realized the service auxiliaries — there are two right now, the Coast Guard Auxiliary, and the Civil Air Patrol which is the service auxiliary for the Air Force — have been around since World War II, and quite frankly they were constructed to do Homeland Defense missions. We believe they provide a great opportunity to serve as a source to support DoD and service missions being done by civilians during surge or sudden requirements, where they come into play, and also for retirees. It also is a great bridge between the civilian — the concept of civilian contractor — and a person in uniform. That is a line you always run into in the discussions: Can’t we contract this out — why does this person have to be in uniform?

Interestingly enough, the Coast Guard has a statute called the temporary reserve. The Commandant of the Coast Guard can take members out of their civil auxiliary and put them in the reserves and give them reserve status. They can do that because their training and certification programs for the members in the auxiliary are kept and maintained at the same standard as their regular reserve members. The auxiliary and the civilians have the same skills and training. In fact in addition to that, and as most of you may know, the Coast Guard has done a lot in integrating and breaking down their units; integrating the reservists with their active duty people. If you go to a flotilla, which is the local level for the Coast Guard, that person, that commander will sit there and tell you he has three types of people — I have regular people, I have my reserve people, and I have my auxiliary people. They have auxiliary members deploying on cutters, they have auxiliary members flying aircraft and performing a number of missions, and the Civil Air Patrol does the same thing.
This is really what I want to talk to you about: the nature, the atmosphere and all these things that are occurring. But what is really critical is to understand that these fights are won by individuals forming associations with groups of people and creating constellations that allow transformation to happen. You have to be aware of these things; you have to be able to understand them to be able to function in this role because we all know one of the first fundamental rules of transformation: If you attack an organization’s culture you are going to lose. Nobody in the services is promoted by attacking the organization’s culture. You have to figure out how to put transformation together. If you want to be somebody who works transformation, sometimes you have to be a fine jeweler; you have to be able to make that little cut on the diamond that gives it its face. Sometimes you have to be a little more creative. You have to know where to place, like a demolition expert, the small charge to bring the whole building down without damaging anything else. You have to do different things that apply. I will touch on a few of these here.

You can go outside of the box all you want, but guess what, when you are done everybody else is still in the box — you have to go back and bring them to you. And they aren’t always willing to do that, and this is another point where I want to make a distinction: between pre-revolutionaries and revolutionaries. Thomas Jefferson, George Washington and John Adams were revolutionaries. The only reason they succeeded was because people before them were pre-revolutionaries. The ones who did not get promoted to 0-7 (flag rank) because they have challenged the organization’s culture, and the ones who didn’t get the headlines and nobody knows about them out West: those are the Sam Adams, and the James Otis’s of the world. Does anyone here know who James Otis is? The James Otis that I was referring to was probably the most famous unknown American in history. Most of what Thomas Jefferson took from in his famous writings came from James Otis. The point that I am trying to make concerns the wheels on the wagon: pre-revolutionaries focus on putting wheels on the box. Why do you do that? Because when you are outside the box you get a different view of the world, and you see that everybody in the box needs to come to your view? It is really hard to drag that box over to you. Until somebody has taken the time to put the wheels in place. Then you can move that box to anywhere you want to go; it moves very easily. But putting the wheels in place means getting people lined up and getting the constellations in place. And that’s what transformation is really all about. It’s about forming new constellations.

In ancient history, the rulers of the world, when they fought their battles on the plains, were divine Gods and they were leaders of their nations — they were God-like. And for the generals that they relied upon, they symbolically reached to the sky and pulled these stars down and put them on their shoulders and made them God-like people. Now, we don’t all get to wear stars literally; sometimes you want to be a star. The question that you have to ask yourself is, are you part of a constellation or are you just another star. And that’s why I wanted to talk to you about these items here because you have to work through these. If you are at leadership meetings, with your leadership, look around; the next time you are with a group of general officers, take a look at how they are working. Are they just another group of stars or are they constellations? If they are not a constellation, it is your job to help them get there. You need to understand how to do that. We need your help to be able
to do this transformation strategy. We can’t get there without your help, without your being engaged on these issues.
BIOGRAPHY

Colonel Gary L. Crone, USAFR

Special Projects Officer

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

Colonel Gary L. Crone serves as the Special Projects Officer reporting directly to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Manpower and Personnel, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Pentagon, Washington DC. In this capacity he is responsible for developing and implementing Reserve component transformation strategies and the formulation, implementation, oversight and evaluation of new and innovative uses of, and affiliation programs of, the seven Reserve components. Prior to his current assignment, he completed an Air Force Fellowship at the John F. Kennedy School of Government National Security Fellows Program, Harvard University.

Colonel Crone graduated from Dartmouth College in 1977 with a cum laude bachelor’s degree. On active duty, he served as a Raven (electronic warfare officer) on the RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft, Offutt Air Force Base, and flew over 2,000 hours, including 128 world-wide reconnaissance missions as a Raven Reconnaissance Crew Commander and instructor. He earned five Air Medals and the Humanitarian Service Medal.

After joining the USAF Reserve in 1984, he obtained a law degree from the University of Notre Dame and served over seven years as a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in Indiana. He also served as an Air Force Academy Liaison Officer. As an Individual Mobilization Augmentee assigned to the Air Intelligence Agency, he performed several special duty tours, including service as the DoD Intelligence Adviser to the General Counsel’s Office of the Drug Enforcement Administration; a Soviet/Warsaw Pact staff electronic warfare analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency, and in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, serving at the Defense Attaché Office in Muscat, Oman, as the reserve Assistant Air Attaché. In 1992, he also served as the Deputy/Acting Chief of Air Operations for the UN mission in the Western Sahara. He also served as the 613th Air Intelligence Flight Operations Officer (Reserve) in Guam. In 1995, he graduated from the Joint Military Intelligence College where he earned a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree and won the top thesis honors. Selected by the UN General Counsel’s Office, he served as an at-large delegate to the United Nations’ first Congress on International Law and peacekeeping held at the UN headquarters in New York in 1995.

Colonel Crone was voluntarily recalled to active duty in 1998 to serve as the Air Force’s Senior Total Force Integration Adviser to the Director of Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Information Operations, Washington, DC. He was awarded the Dr. James P. Gilligan Award by the Air Force Intelligence Reserve alumni in 2000, which recognized him for distinguished support to intelligence reserve forces. After completing his fellowship at Harvard in 2001, he was selected for his current assignment and remains on full-time active duty.
Honorable Albert C. Zapanta  
*Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board*

Good afternoon! On the slide that depicts all the logos of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) and its constituency — if you notice you have the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives — because that’s what gave us our life back in 1952. The rest are the seven services that make up almost 50 percent of the Armed Forces representing the Guard and the Reserve. The background of the Board is basically: in 1947 President Truman, under the recommendation of Secretary of Defense Forrestal, wanted to see what the nation could do to have a reserve in place should there be another contingency, especially after all the experience we had from the second World War sitting around as we demobilized throughout the country. So in 1952 they commissioned a group known as the Committee on Civilian Components (which became the Reserve component). What makes us rather interesting is the RFPB is not only established in the Secretary of Defense’s Office, but it also has the requirement to report to Congress and the President annually.

There are, as you know, more than 60 boards, commissions, and advisory groups as part of the Department of Defense. Of the three senior boards which are the RFPB, the Defense Science Board, and the Defense Policy Board, we are the only one that is both joint and civilian and military, and we are the only one that is in law an actual part of the government through the Department of Defense at this time, which basically gives us some extra latitude to do the kinds of things that we would like to do. Specifically, we are the principal — with me as the chairman — senior policy advisor to the Secretary. We act independently, and we report annually.

Every twenty-five years, there seems to be a change in the dynamics of how we fight our wars, and we are going through that as we speak, especially as it relates to the reserve components. The board is made up of three Assistant Secretaries for Reserve Manpower from Army, Navy and Air Force. The active-duty members have three stars, ranging from the Director of the Joint Staff, Director of the Army Staff, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard. Then we are made up of two-star flag or general officers of each of the seven services. As chairman, I have the authority to appoint *ex officio* members and we have done that: the Surgeon General of the United States and the Director of the Public Health Service are now on the board; the Chief of the National Guard Bureau; the two Assistants to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and now FEMA; and we are going to hold discussions with the Department of Homeland Security for a representative. As you know, they are all part of the process at this point.

When I came on board one of the things I wanted to try to accomplish was to set a vision, mission, objectives, and what kinds of activities that we were going to get into most specifically in meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld. What were the changes that he and I discussed? It was very clear that there was a need for timely advice and recommendations so that during this time that we are going through post-9/11, especially in the Reserve Components, we might be able to be a real part of the decisionmaking process. The Board charter as I see it as Chairman, is to reconnect the reserve components representing the Department of Defense to the citizenry or what’s known as the citizen
patriot; to be part of the transformation of the total force and to help strengthen communications and bonds between citizenry, reserve components, the state Adjutants General, and the Congress, as well as here in the Department of Defense.

One of the ways we reconnect with America is through citizen patriot forums. We go out to the various combatant commands — we try to have two board meetings outside of the Washington DC area. Our spring and fall meetings are here in the Pentagon. The goal is to meet with about forty of what we call key citizen patriots — first responders; those elected officials, hospital administrators, educators, small business people, major corporate executives, and interested community leaders. Email is my way of communicating, and about every two months we send out about twenty-four hundred emails, including to individuals, every Adjutant General, to every Congressman and every Senator, and people that are part of what we consider our constituency base of the RFPB.

Transformation — that’s a word you’ve heard a lot — and I will tell you that we are very much engaged in the sense that there are reserve component issues that are being dealt with. In the symposium we held on the 19th and 20th of May, we dealt over two days with a lot of information. What we attempted to do was to bring together the key policymakers as well as the operators, to look at the reserve components for the role, the missions, the employment, and the doctrine we are now looking at as well, to connect with the citizenry. Our board will be going, the last ten days of this July, to the Middle East. We will be going to Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, and maybe one other state or nation. Prior to that, we will be launching out of Tampa, where we will be visiting SOCOM and CENTCOM prior to going in. The sponsor forum is exactly what I mentioned to you — a symposium that really tries to look at the future and where we play in the future; not only the total force, but also what we are now calling not just the away game, but the home game known as Homeland Defense, strengthening those communication lines.

One of the things that we did was look at our vision as to how we were going to conduct ourselves as part of the board. During the board a year ago this last May — my first board meeting as Chairman — we decided there were some very important activities or actions that we had to take. Number one was communications, number two was education and number three was building trust. One of the things that we have found in the relationship

![Honorable Albert C. Zapanta](image-url)
between the active and the reserve components is a lack of going both ways—from the active to the reserve component—and so we are setting about trying to educate as well as communicate that there is an opportunity—especially now with the home game—to really reach especially those of you who are in the information/intelligence game—to really leverage those civilian skills and positions of the reserve components sitting out there as first responders or in the health field or whatever it might be.

Visibility of the Reserve Components! I don’t think I have to do much about that at this point because it has been pretty much on the front page. I’ll predict that it’s going to be more on the front page because as we demobilize—I will tell you and some of you may know this—that we broke the TPFDD (Time-Phased Force-Deployment Database) very well. We broke it in so many ways in doing what we call DUICs or Divertive Unit Identification Codes, where we did one-zees, and two-zees, and three-zees. We broke the structure, broke brigades, and battalions and so the integrity was lost. There is another part to this. They were attached in groups to active units. When those active units come home, what happens to those DUICs? We’re losing them; we don’t even know where they are in theater in some instances. I can tell you about a Navy Medical Unit out of San Diego, of twenty individuals still looking at how to get home. There are some real opportunities for us to succeed.

Annual Report! We do that every year. We send it to Congress in April so that it is part of their process in the budget-making process and decisionmaking. We highlight various specific kinds of activities that we think are important, such as compensation, benefits, or a revised cat card—some of you may or may not realize on a cat card it says active, reserve, National Guard. I don’t understand why because I still wear the same uniform as everybody else does. And we need to get out of that mode and we ought to get out of the lack of trust, and we can have the chip in there that we can swipe and immediately it will say active-duty or not without having that pre-set condition.

Transforming intelligence in the Gulf War; that’s what you are here for in the sense of the more specific theme today. But in the general sense as to what we’re looking at—how does one really leverage from the reserve component the information and the intelligence capability, with JRICs and a few other areas. How many are in the JRICs? The commanding one, which one? I am going to go out to visit the one in Phoenix; that is one run by all reservists. There are others, and so I’ll let you know with my Special Forces background, obviously intelligence is very important to accomplishing the mission. I think those are really important and will become more important in the homeland defense atmosphere. The Secretary did direct how we were going to engage in the whole intelligence information-gathering mission of the Reserve Components. There are no answers yet. And we are all trying to find answers. Hopefully, some of you might have some good ideas. Please feel free to email us at the RFPB because we are moving forward in a few areas.

The other is where we are right now, in the Global War on Terrorism. The intelligence requirements are different than for conventional operations. Why? You are here in the Homeland, you’ve got “posse comitatus,” and all kinds of restraints that basically say what
you can or cannot do. There is a second piece of this and we found it when we were out in one of our nine citizen’s patriot forums — where every one of the first responders kept saying “You know it is really frustrating when the Federal ‘whatever’ entity cannot pass down intelligence information because of classification.” You know that’s terrible when you think that it might cost lives in a matter of minutes over a short period of time. Hopefully, those are the kinds of things that we are going to see changed as the Homeland Security Department goes forward as well as through our missions in the reserve components.

Special Operations has now a new focus and before I didn’t want anybody to have anything about me anywhere — any kind of printed or celluloid record — because we used to be the shadow warrior, and I still believe that — but now it has kind of become a chic thing to be and everyone wants to go out there and do it. I can say to you now, at least people are starting to understand the applications in the kind of limited warfare that we are into, especially in the Global War on Terrorism. The reserves and in this case, the National Guard’s Special Operations and the Reserve’s Civil Affairs units are representing over 50 percent of the people with boots in the ground in the Area of Operations. That says something immediately. I’ll get into some other activities that we feel give the reserves a much better way to go.

What are the barriers to utilizing the reserve components and intelligence in the Global War on Terrorism? The active-duty units resist using us. Some of it may be okay in a sense that we are not going to be there forever. They are there. That’s their career path. But it seems to me a good commander makes sure whatever asset he or she has, they employ; forget guard, reserve or active; forget male or female; forget color; forget accent; forget last name — employ it. The other is there is outdated policy in the Department of Defense. You and I both know that we are still very much in the post-industrial world or in the post-Cold War world, and we are trying and struggling to really understand the transformation for the 21st century and how we handle the new environment that we’re in, which means in fact we need to change policy. Of course, that’s a key role for our board’s recommendations.

There are going to be more volunteers from the reserve component going into active status. You are going to see some things coming out and you may have heard about it. You are going to have the ability for reservists and National Guard to actually go on active duty for a year or two if that’s what they want to do because some of us — and I am one of them — I made a decision not to be a career military person full time; but I made another decision: I wanted to be a career military person. I did it for 36 years. So at the end of the day how do we accommodate that, how do we have people that want to spend the time, that have the kind of education and experience that really impact us?

There are barriers still to utilizing the reserve components in intelligence, in funding and in joint education. How do we expect reservists and National Guard people to achieve flag rank or become general officers if they can’t even get an allocation to the purple schools? So that’s something, hopefully, we will be working with our board during a visit with the Joint Forces Command. We’re dealing with that as well as with the air component
of the Joint Forces Command and some of our other friends. Again, what’s happening? We’re fighting jointly, but we’re organized and structured by service and so there is a lot of discontinuity that obviously we’re going to have to deal with, especially as we are starting to get ready to fight any other kind of activity in the future.

There are obviously opportunities for voluntary services—usually the reserve components’ volunteers are motivated just like the actives are motivated—and so we need to seize on that and employ it in such a way that it benefits what we are trying to do in accomplishing the mission. And we are also dealing with much more real-world, special-operations missions. In Special Operations Command, as I noted, 50 percent of the intelligence personnel at SOCOM are reservists and National Guard. We have visited six combatant commands in my tenure in a little over a year, and every single combatant commander made it clear that over 35 percent of their staff were reservists or National Guard, and they could not do the mission without them. So again, hopefully that is going to help bring down some of that lack of trust barrier between the two.

The most challenging transformation for Reserve Component intelligence is obtaining support in the Active Component community. It seems like I’ve heard this my entire career in the military. So I’m sure that it’s not something of which you are unaware. I am going to stop here, to have time for some questions and hopefully some answers.

First Respondent: Lieutenant Colonel Stacy, Army G2.
Really more of a comment than a question, dealing with the point that the Services are resisting using Reserve Component assets. I think I can speak for most of the folks in the room here, who see this from the standpoint of being in the reserves. The problem doesn’t seem to be the services really resisting the use of reserve assets. The difficulty is getting the services to use those assets via reachback to a CONUS home station—to some operational facility. In the Army, we have right now about 80 to 85 percent of the Army Reserve unit military intelligence force deployed and about 45 percent or so of the Army Guard. We are definitely engaged, but it’s difficult getting the active Intelligence Community to export work back to home states and as we hit the two year mark on people and they are going to have to stand down, there is going to be more of a need for that.

Mr. Zapanta: Well, you are speaking to the barrier that suggests because you are active and this person is a reservist over here, I don’t trust him so I am not going to use him. That’s not all that I am talking about. There are structural institutional problems. I think we’re seeing much more of the change in attitude. But at the end of the day it’s still there, and it’s a trust factor that we have to deal with. The only way that I’ve known how to do it is, “I am as good or better than any active duty guy walking around.” It’s that simple.

Second Responder: Commander Bob Simmons.
He (first responder) mentioned the two-year barrier. I am just returning from a tour at SPAWAR (Space and Naval Warfare) and have just come to DIA. There are a number of places where I could step right in and they would love to have me, put me to work—they could care less if I am a reservist—that’s not a factor except that the reserve, the big Navy or whoever won’t let me be there for so long. It’s not the reservist; it is the administration that will not let the reservist do the job.
Mr. Zapanta: Right on, and I know that and that's why you have a board called the RFPB. Anything you can get to us on that will be appreciated. Now let me say this to you: each of the services plays it differently because of orders, Title-32 or Title-10. One of the things that came up when we were in Guantanamo Bay with my board last year was that we had 75 percent of the 1,700 soldiers, sailors, marines that were there — and air, and coast guard — who were reservists and National Guard. I can tell you that all of them in each of the services were not getting the same base pay, were getting different benefits; some were getting per diem and some were not. I could give you the whole ugly situation down there because of how we bring them on orders and how each of the services use their reservist or guard person. That again is one of the things that we are trying to look at and rectify. I think you are going to see some of that change in the future.

Third Respondent: Major Al Plymale, with Army Reserve Intelligence.
Our unit was mobilized Post 9/11 and I got the impression during the time that they weren’t interested in our structure. They really want our E4s and below, and that’s okay and I’m all for thinking out of the box and coming up with new strategies, except when this crises is over and when we demobilize the soldiers and sailors, it is still our responsibility to train them. So we have E5s, E6s, and E7s right now in military intelligence-land and I don’t care what branch — these folks are gone.

Reply by Zapanta: If you look at our 2002 report we specifically talk not so much MI but the whole factor that we are breaking our system. And what we are doing is by repeating every six months or three months, by bringing what we call the high tempo-low intensity organizations, we are just eating them up. Secondly, when you bring on a lower-rank individual, whether it’s officer or enlisted, they may be an assistant manager at Wal-Mart and they’re losing money. You also have situations where doctors, dentists, farmers, and small business people are losing their livelihood and so there are some problems within that and people are going to leave. We haven’t seen yet, I think the real impact on retention and recruiting. Recruiting seems fine, but the retention is going to cost us because you have trained people. Okay, that’s a big cost. We need to find a way to keep people until we can fix how we mobilize. One of the things that really bugs me at the mobilization locations is that you get alerted, you go to the home station, you go to the mobilization station, and then go into the AOR. Three times they look at the same packet and certify three times. Now, either we are going to trust the local commander or not. Again, it is this whole trust factor. But I think hopefully people are starting to recognize that but it’s not easy.

Fourth Responder: Captain James Boyd from the Reserve Intelligence Command.
On the issue of recruiting, I’ll tell you we are beginning to see indications that a lot of us have to get that active-duty pool coming off active duty to come in the reserves. What we are finding is that with this tempo of mobilization you’ve got an individual who is coming off active duty and the last thing they want to do is to go in reserves because they could be immediately turned around and mobilized because of the critical skills they have since they just came off active duty. So we are beginning to see some problems on the recruiting side. Were not seeing too much on the non-prior service side, but we are getting no vets at least in the Navy, I don’t know about the other services, if they are seeing the same thing.
Reply by Zapanta: Yup! And I think we are going to see more of it in the other services. So we have got to find a better way to re-mission the reserves in the sense that — I’m a big advocate — we’re going to have all the shooters in the active. That’s okay. When we blew through to Baghdad our end was hanging out, and we lost a lot of people because of that. The majority of the people that got killed or hurt weren’t in point-to-point combat. If you’ve blown through you do not have a whole lot of time to watch the rear. A great mission for the reserves as I see it is stabilization. You’ve got the Stryker Brigades. Let’s give the reserves a structure called stabilization brigade. You can put together civil affairs, civil works, intelligence, information technology (IT), and medical and MPs, and guess what: they are that fourth brigade with the 101st. There are all kinds of ways we can do it, so how do we mission it? I happen to think a real, real critical area to look at is how we employ the reserve intelligence and IT community because that’s where we are going. That’s the future.

It has been a pleasure; I hope I have given you some little ticklers to think about. We are on the web — under RFPB. Please send me any input that you might have; we are looking for it. We have the flexibility to step outside the box, which we do. And I am sure the General says that too, because he has been there with me.
BIOGRAPHY

Honorable Albert C. Zapanta
Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld appointed Al Zapanta as Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board on 21 March 2002. The Board was established by Congressional statute in 1952, and acts as the principal, independent policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters involving the Reserve components of the United States Armed Forces, including the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve. The 24-member Board is composed of Assistant Secretaries of the three military departments for Reserve Affairs; Active, Guard and Reserve flag and general officers representing the Joint Staff, each of the Services, and their Guard and Reserve components.

Mr. Zapanta is the president and CEO of the United States-Mexico Chamber of Commerce based in Washington, DC. This is a non-profit, bi-national corporation that promotes trade and investment between the two North American nations. It represents more than 2,000 businesses and maintains 14 regional offices in the U.S. and six in Mexico. He is also Chairman of the Board of the United States-Mexico Cultural and Educational Foundation. He has worked in business, government and politics for over thirty-six years. In the private sector, he worked as an industrial engineer for Bethlehem Steel, and as Director of Governmental Affairs for ARCO until his retirement in 1993.

Mr. Zapanta served President Nixon as a White House Fellow in 1973-74. He was appointed by President Ford to serve as Assistant Secretary of Administration and Management, United States Department of Interior, 1976-77. President Reagan appointed him to the U.S. State Department Advisory Committee on International Trade Technology and Development, and President George W. Bush named him a private sector delegate to the United States-Mexico Partnership for Prosperity.

Mr. Zapanta began his military career by enlisting in the U.S. Army in 1964, reaching the rank of Sergeant in the 12th Special Forces Group. Commissioned through the California Army National Guard Officer Candidate School program in 1966 as an infantry officer, his military service includes duty as a Special Forces Officer 1966-72; Platoon Leader and Company Commander, 75th Infantry (Ranger-Airborne), 9th Infantry Division, with duty in the Republic of Vietnam in 1969. From 1972-78, he served in the 63rd and 97th ARCOM, USAR. In 1978-87, he served in the 40th Infantry Division (M), California Army National Guard as Battalion Commander, 3/160th Infantry Battalion, 40th Infantry Division. Returning to the USAR (1987-94) as an Individual Mobilization Augmentee in OASD/RA and SO-LIC in the Pentagon, he also served as commander of the U.S. Peacekeeping Observer Element, United Nations Mission for Referendum in the Western Sahara. He served in the Washington DC National Guard as Special Assistant to the Chief of the National Guard (1994-96). He also was appointed by the Governor of Virginia to the rank of Major General in the Virginia state militia. His combat actions...
resulted in the award of the Silver Star, five Bronze Stars for valor, the Purple Heart and 30 other awards during the Vietnam War. He was also awarded the Joint Service Commendation Medal for DESERT STORM, RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, and RESTORE DEMOCRACY in Haiti.
DENIS CLIFT, thank you for this opportunity. I want to talk to you all a little about JRICs and I will keep my comments very short, maybe about 5 to 8 minutes, because I do want your questions. What I want to do is talk a little about where I think JRICs are heading, and about some of the conversation this morning stimulated by our keynote speaker: conversation about jointness, about reachback, about new methods and transformation.

In my mind the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program and the JRICs—the sites themselves—are correctly positioned to be where we need them for the future. It was the Defense Secretary’s Memo that initiated it—kicked it off—in 1995. From that we grew kind of slowly and we had to find the sites, get the equipment out there. But I think the key vision of an effective total force model, that’s what we are talking about. The ability to integrate operationally in peacetime and wartime: that’s what the keynote speaker was talking about.

Intelligence production is an adjunct to training. At this point, 1995, that’s when the reserve intelligence program all of a sudden kind of left the rest of the reserve programs behind because what they were doing was they were training to be ready to augment or be mobilized. What we started doing in 1995 was actually doing production, and by doing production, learning about the intelligence products we were working on, using the exact same equipment, hardware and software, so that when we were mobilized there was no ramp-up time needed, or maybe we could be mobilized with the JRICs themselves.

Yesterday, we started with 28 sites, all with modem connectivity, and Service host responsibility. Now Service host responsibility posed some problems because I would tell you being an architect—all of our facilities were different; they had different chains of command, different leadership. Some services wanted to provide toilet paper and some did not. It all varied. But in the end—and if we look again at modern connectivity you might discount bandwidth—it was that slow, but it was a great start because it got us organized to thinking in that mindset on a drill weekend versus sitting in a room, or in a classroom listening to training lectures. We could actually produce and contribute to the active forces, and the databases were our primary project. Today, we have twenty-seven sites, not that we just dropped one; we actually dropped three and added two, so we did some realignment. With T1 to T3 connectivity, we got the best of the best—everything that DIA here would want.
With JWICS (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System) VTC (video-teleconferencing) established fairly recently — and frankly, one of the road blocks for us was a trust thing — when we have a crisis, they want to mobilize people; they want to get them out there to the gaining command site and the reason is because that 0-3 or 0-4 that’s running the watch and doing the analysis wants that reservist right there so they can see them, hand them something and say “analyze this.” With the VTC though, we start breaking some of those barriers because I would tell you over there at the Pentagon or here at DIA or in any of our active duty commands, it’s routine to get on VTC all over the world with your J-2s and N-2s and talk business. That’s the way they do their jobs. If we get this capability in all of our JRICs, we will have that capability as well. Full-time support: Captain Wilson mentioned this morning that it was just left up to the Services and the Reserve Commands to kind of take care of the sites and help the reserve units like they always did. But DIA actually invested in putting full time personnel at the sites to help coordinate the production, and making sure that the equipment was up and running.

I can tell you in 1996, 1997, 1998 it wasn’t unusual for the reserve unit to come in on Saturday morning, and guess what, the system is down. We lost half a day; we had to bring it up. Now, with full-time support there, they can not only coordinate the production, coordinate with the gaining command, but they can be there to make sure the systems are ready to go. Look at the depth of the product as it is now compared to what it was yesterday. We basically do it all. We do everything the gaining commands can do.

In terms of customers, I want to mention Homeland Defense and continuity of operations. Take a look at where most of our customers are at CONUS Headquarters all around the country. And here are the JRICs spread out over 27 sites in the U.S. Again, when we are talking about Homeland Defense, keep that in your mind for a moment; I will bring it around to that.

Let’s talk mobilization for a second. We are right in the middle of mobilizing and demobilizing and we understand that. There are people who have said — I’ve heard this in leadership meetings — that we did not mobilize enough of the JRICs. Why didn’t we? I think there are a lot of reasons, if you go back to Kosovo there were probably only ten that we mobilized. At our high point, we actually mobilized over 400 individuals. Now I would look at that as half full. We’re clearly on our way up to using JRIC personnel; we’re getting comfortable with that. But even if you said 400 — and I quickly did some math — and you take the fact that the 400 are generally pretty close to home — and apply the
numbers: $70 a day it costs to have a mobilized forward command take care of food and per diem and things like that. Take that 400 times $70, and it is about $28,000 a day. You take that times a year, and it is $8.4 million. Now, for our Services that's a pretty big cost. These JRICs are actually saving some money. I think that we need to start looking at the metrics in that way because they are paying dividends for the active-duty side.

Some of the highlights besides the mobilization itself: What most people don’t realize is that you don’t have a true metric unless you take into account that many of the engaged combatant commands off-load their other AOR intelligence responsibility back to the JRICs. You name the country, the AOR, and generally some reservist of any Service is back there taking care of that responsibility of daily intelligence summaries and reporting on those other AOR countries.

I go back to the earlier statement about doing production as adjunct training. I would say with today’s technology, today’s equipment, and today’s software that if we, in 1995, had decided to stay in the classroom training, there is no way we could have mobilized the number of people we mobilized into intelligence centers and have them walk right to the terminal and start producing. I didn’t hear a single incident where we had any of our people in any service rejected and told that they weren’t qualified to do the job. We’re not working on simple things; we’re working using high technology. I think that’s a testament to 1995 that says, “If you train in the way you are going to play, we’re going to be light years ahead.”

Captain Wilson, I think it was, who mentioned this morning a few tests that are on-going right now. JICPAC is using Fort Worth as a co-op site, for example. I will tell you, being on the architect side here at DIA, that continuity of the operations is an extremely high priority all the way up to the Under-Secretary level. Each command is responsible for looking at ways that they can continue operations. How do they network? If you take a JRIC, which has already got the exact equipment, has all of the communications capability and has square footage there, not enough to take a DIA and swallow it, but clearly enough so that they can take an operations area or a portion of several sides of DIA and keep those operations going. It’s ideal. It’s absolutely ideal. Embedded staff: some of our gaining commands have already started taking their own analysts — I use Fort Gillem and the Joint Analysis Center-Molesworth as examples — and they are actually supporting some of their civilian analysts to reside, live and work at Fort Gillem. What it does is to give them a base for continuity of operations. Some people are already there using their equipment.

For us in the reserves, it gives us experts to help us understand the product set-up by the command. They’re there during the week. It’s an ideal time; you don’t face parking problems and all those other kind of things. Some of the observations include thinking that maybe now they’ll hire civilians and locate them in the JRIC area and have them operate out of San Diego or the Pacific Northwest or wherever they need to be.

We’re investing in the capability to have the backup power and electric needs for the sites to be able to operate 24/7. Again, this goes back to continuity of operations — if we have that capability, it checks the box and makes that site much more relevant. With regional intelligence centers for Homeland Defense, if you remember on the map where
the sites are, and if you remember where the Headquarters of the gaining commands are that need cooperative support, they are ideal. For Homeland Defense, you can take any regional area in the country—and this is just Jim Manzelmann saying it, and no one has come to DIA and asked me—but if there is an intelligence issue—if a governor needs information, you name it—if there is a crisis in a given area of this country; what better way to set up a form of communication at a high level than with the use of JRICs—the regional area tied to DIA or FBI, or whoever, to communicate with the on-scene commander.

What HR 4205 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001) does for us—and I am going to tell you from our standpoint that we’ve got the facilities, the technology, new equipment, and we have the people trained—the last piece we’re missing in this whole thing is how we are organized and that’s because of our Service culture—different equipment and all the different things that we fight with—and I think we are starting to get the momentum on re-organization, now that the Office of the Secretary of Defense is making some of these changes, I think we are going to have absolutely the best program there is. Thank you!
BIOGRAPHY

Rear Admiral James Manzelmann, Jr., USNR
Commander, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command

Rear Admiral James Manzelmann graduated from Maine Township High School South in 1966 and attended the University of Oklahoma where he earned a bachelor’s degree in architecture. Upon graduation, he was commissioned through the University’s NROTC program. On active duty, he served two and one half years as an officer aboard the USS Edson (DD 946), a Pacific-based destroyer, with two deployments to Vietnam.

In 1974, RADM Manzelmann returned to the Midwest and affiliated with the Naval Reserve Intelligence Program and pursued his architecture career in Tulsa, Oklahoma. As a drilling reservist, his early leadership assignments included: Commanding Officer, Naval Intelligence Support Center 0711, Tulsa, followed by Executive Officer and Commanding Officer, Fleet Intelligence Rapid Support Team 0370, Naval Air Station, Dallas, Texas. He was voluntarily recalled to active duty in July 1988 to serve as the Executive Officer of Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC) for two years. During the second year of that assignment, he served on a select joint planning team that merged the three service-based (Navy, Air Force and Army) intelligence centers into the single Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC). In July 1991, he was reassigned to the Naval Intelligence Command in Washington, D.C., for nine months, where he assisted with transition planning for the move of five intelligence commands and 2,000 personnel into a new 600,000-square-foot facility, the National Maritime Intelligence Center, in Suitland, Maryland.

After detaching from active duty, RADM Manzelmann returned to southern California and his architectural practice in the spring of 1992 and resumed his Reserve affiliation in Reserve Intelligence Area 4 in San Diego. His most recent leadership assignments prior to being selected for flag include Commanding Officer, Intelligence Voluntary Training Unit 0121; Chief of Staff for Reserve Intelligence Area 4; and Reserve Intelligence Area Commander, Area 4. He was assigned as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training and Readiness for Commander, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command prior to his selection as the Commander, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command.

RADM Manzelmann’s military decorations include the Meritorious Service Medal (with Gold Star), Navy Commendation Medal (with three Gold Stars), and the Navy Achievement Medal as well as various unit commendations and service and campaign awards.

RADM Manzelmann is a licensed architect and the Senior Technical Manager for Facilities for the Defense Intelligence Agency.
I want to thank the College for inviting me to tell the NORTHCOM story. Hopefully you will find it interesting. I will be presenting to you a briefing that we've given to a number of audiences including the Reserve Forces Policy Board when they came to visit us. They saw an earlier version because things continue to change. This updated version will give you a good idea of where we are and what we are planning in terms of the North American Air Defense Command and NORTHCOM.

Now, although we are a dual directorate of intelligence supporting both NORAD and NORTHCOM, I am going to make most of my comments today on NORTHCOM. That's the new part, so I am going to focus on that. I am going to start when NORTHCOM was really just a glimmer in the eye to now when we are a brighter glimmer in the eye. Actually, we haven't reached our full operational capability and so a lot of it is still in the planning stages. I always like to examine the NORTHCOM mission because this is the newest combatant command, and it is a little bit different; dare I use the word transformational? We use the word transformational? We are a smaller staff than what's normal. As you will see we have a different mix of active and reserve components than what is normal for a combatant command.

And that includes our intelligence center. We have an intelligence center that's not your "father's Joint Intelligence Center or (JIC)," if you will. It's much smaller. Our intelligence center is the Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center. It relies to a significant degree on other centers of excellence in the Intelligence Community, including DIA, which has been very helpful to us. We have a total of approximately 124 billets. We're also augmented by contractors, civil service employees and interagency liaison officers. The intelligence center is very small, when you consider that Captain Noll, who is our Director of Intelligence, came from JAC Molesworth that had about 1,200 people. So, as you can see, we're much smaller. I want to point this out so that you understand the importance of the reserve component in the way we designed this.

Now the thing about NORTHCOM that I want to point out is that we have two overarching missions. The first is Homeland Defense and the second is civil support. The Department of Defense is the lead agency for the homeland defense mission and NORTHCOM is the combatant commander for that mission. We also have the civil support role where we don't respond until we are asked to by the lead Federal Agency. If the request is properly vetted through the Secretary of Defense, and we get authorization, then we'll go ahead and respond. It's a mission I personally find fascinating and am glad to a part of. When you boil it down, it comes down to protecting the American people where they live and work; coming to their aid should a disaster happen.

As Colonel Rowland mentioned in the introduction, I was a member of the NORTHCOM Implementation Planning Team (IPT). There were two to three dozen of us
from Joint Forces Command, NORAD, and the Joint Staff, as well as some other inter-agency players and the National Guard Bureau and SOUTHCOM. Right from the beginning this was a different combatant command because when you look at the AORs, NORTHCOM’s includes the continental United States. The importance of this is that the reserve component is ideally suited for this mission. As General Eberhart, NORTHCOM commander, has said, “there wouldn’t be a NORTHCOM without a National Guard.” There are very close ties between Northern Command and the reserve component. So we recognized the need for that reserve component structure right from the beginning. Also, the ability to use the reserve component for this mission compensates for the relatively small active-duty structure that we have. Within the Directorate of Intelligence, we also wanted to leverage the historical role that the National Guard has in a lot of these mission areas, and the capabilities that they have that are sometimes unique, to gain that expertise in the command. Finally, we wanted to consider traditional and innovative solutions, looking not only to augmentation and crisis support that has been discussed here a number times through the ability to leverage remote support, but also to do it really on a continuum basis. I like that continuum service concept briefed earlier, because what we’re looking for within NORTHCOM J-2 is a continuum of service from reserve support—support all the time, but at various levels.

In Colorado Springs, we have gone through a really major change. We were at ground zero for the major moving parts of the Unified Command Plan changes in what has been described as the most significant UCP update since 1948. We started out as the NORAD/SPACE J-2. We had to split NORAD and Space and then to take Space and merge it with U.S. Strategic Command and then stand up Northern Command, then marry up NORAD with Northern Command. That was a significant undertaking, but even beyond that, it had a very significant impact with our reserve billets because we lost all the SPACECOM billets. NORAD has always relied on a U.S. Command to be married up to it that had reserve capability. In other words, that billet structure didn’t reflect the relative mission emphasis that we had been doing. So the UCP caused us some initial difficulties in maintaining our level of reserve support to NORAD and in providing reserve support to NORTHCOM. We are working some interim and long-term solutions that offset this problem.

We do have a Joint Table of Mobilization manning document (JTMD). There are requirements for reserve IMAs from all services, as well as from the Coast Guard. I should have
mentioned that the Coast Guard is a very significant player in our command. If you look at the command shield, there are five stars at the top — those stars represent the four services and the Coast Guard. We also have the presence today of active-duty Coast Guard intelligence folks and we need the help from Coast Guard reserves as well. The JTMD calls for 242 total billets. Here is the basic rundown: The JTMD is not approved and we really haven’t made a whole lot of progress to date partially because the active-duty Manning document is still undergoing some scrutiny in terms of whether it’s transformational enough in some respects — and so the JTMD has been put on the back burner. Nevertheless, the services have started filling our billets on the active-duty side. In other words, they have allowed us to fill using the existing document even though it still requires some development to be formally approved.

Quite honestly, what we’re probably going to do on the Reserve side is to ask for similar consideration from the Services. Senior leadership may sign a “promise me” card and we’ll take it to the services as an initial step if they will start enabling us to have some reserves at a certain agreed-upon percentage. That is something we hope to do. The Coast Guard has done something similar. In fact, they have earmarked five reserves in their force even though a formal requirement has not been stated. They understand that there is a NORTHCOM requirement but it has just not been finally approved.

As I indicated earlier, the National Guard is a big player in the command. We want it to be a big player within the intelligence directorate as well so we planned different levels of support. First of all in the headquarters itself there is a Colorado National Guard unit that is in the process of being stood up to augment the entire headquarters directorates — J-1 through J-8. It calls for a total of thirty billets as an initial augmentation. The J-2 has two billets — they are intelligence planner positions that will allow us to augment our battle staffs in time of crises. We are also asking for Combined Intelligence Fusion Center augmentation support from the National Guard. Now, I want to carefully caveat this, because Colonel Leacock is sitting there; and he’s going to come after me if I say it incorrectly. To date, CIFC augmentation from the National Guard is still very much in the discussion stage. There has been no commitment of resources and that sort of thing. That being said, what we would like to see is a relatively small unit of about forty or so folks who would augment the CIFC in garrison and also be capable in supporting us in Colorado Springs with augmentation during a crisis if necessary. Again, the reason why we want this support is that we have IMA billets, but we feel that the National Guard brings a special background expertise in some of these mission areas. It is important to have some of their present augmentation as well. That’s why we were asking for that. The unit we’ve been tentatively talking to is in the Maryland National Guard. We’ve chosen this unit for a couple of reasons. First, already we’re being tagged or are discussing various liaisons on the active-duty side at the alphabet soup of law enforcement agencies, and the intelligence agencies. So, we’re hoping that the unit here enables us to provide some of the weekend coverage for some of our Monday through Friday folks. We discovered in recent exercises like TOPOFF that sometimes we really could use twenty-four hour liaison capability so that would give us the capability to do that. Second, it provides the CIFC with an additional augmentation pool.
Finally, there is an initiative that the National Guard Bureau and others have been looking at. And that is having many fusion cells in the states, and we feel like we could play a valuable role to plug into those and have two-way information flow. That is still very much on the drawing board, but is something that is being examined now. There may be a Tiger Team that will eventually address some of this down the road.

The thing that I want to emphasize about augmentation is that we have a need to augment during actual crises and we are definitely looking at remote JRIC support. In fact, we have a team that has stood up in Leavenworth and we’re also looking at a team in the San Antonio area. We have discussed and studied a concept, not unlike what the Admiral mentioned, in terms of having a small team aligned by FEMA region. The JRICs orientate very nicely to the FEMA regional headquarters. FEMA is the lead federal agency we would most often be called on to support in the civil support role. So it seems to be a very good fit.

There’s been some folks from Hanscom AFB that are here today and who have looked at a similar concept. Even though it is only in the study stage, I did want to mention it because it is worth continued study and may come to fruition sometime in the future. The last concept that I wanted to mention is that a number of you may be familiar with JTF-6, which uses reserve intelligence to do counterdrug support to lead federal civil agencies at their request. What’s been discussed is, could this program, which by the way ends this fiscal year on 30 September, be reoriented toward more of a Homeland Defense role? There have been a lot of discussions of the struggles that some of the federal law enforcement agencies have with the intelligence analytical part of combating terrorism. Not because they’re not extremely bright but because they haven’t really developed a career path for that sort of thing. And so this might be something that would allow us to continue this program in support of them at their request, assuming it’s properly vetted. It comes with a relatively small cost. What we’ve looked at is to try and get money to fund about thirty reservists in this program. Comparatively that is low. I think the level of support was in the low hundreds in the previous program. So we’re hoping something could be worked out on that—I know a number of you have expressed interest in this. And if you have money that you would like to offer us, we will be happy to talk.

The message we want to send is that we are absolutely committed at NORTHCOM to fully integrating reserve capabilities and our eventual reserve component goal is to fully leverage all the Reserve Component intelligence capabilities that are out there and bring it to bear in winning the war in terrorism. Thank you!
BIOGRAPHY

Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Redwine, USAFR

Intelligence Planner

Directorate of Intelligence, United States Northern Command

Lieutenant Colonel Robert (Rob) R. Redwine is an Intelligence Planner for the Director of Intelligence, United States Northern Command, and he is also detailed as the Intelligence Oversight Officer for the Inspector General, for Headquarters North American Aerospace Defense Command, where he has served since October 2001. He previously served as a member of the site survey team for the Northern Command Implementation Planning Team, which was charged with planning the standup of the Department of Defense’s newest combatant command with the responsibility for homeland defense and civil support missions.

Lt Col Redwine is a 1985 graduate of Southern Nazarene University. He has a Master’s Degree in International Relations from Webster University and a Juris Doctor degree in Law from the University of Oklahoma.

Lt Col Redwine served on active duty from 1985 to 1994. After initial Intelligence Officer training and service as Chief, Intelligence Applications, HQ AFCC/IN, Scott AFB, Illinois, he received Undergraduate Missile Training at Vandenberg AFB, California, and served as Senior Flight Commander and Senior Missile Combat Crew Commander, 351st Missile Wing at Whiteman AFB, Missouri. He also served as Flight Commander at Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

After transferring to the USAF Reserve, he returned to active duty three times due to Presidential Recall, in addition to serving several short voluntary tours, including duty as an Emergency Action Procedures Officer at Headquarters, United States Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska; as Intelligence Officer and Operations Officer, 690th Information Operations Squadron, Kelly AFB, Texas; and as Acting Vice Commander, Combined Intelligence Center, Peterson AFB, Colorado, before assuming his current duties with Northern Command.

His personal decorations include the Meritorious Service Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, Joint Service Commendation Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, Air Force Commendation Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, Joint Service Achievement Medal, and Air Force Achievement Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster.
About one-third of the Military Intelligence (MI) force structure of the reserve component is in the Guard organization. The challenge we have in the Guard is that one-third is focused on the Cold War scenario. The big issue is that we have MI companies and MI battalions that are supporting battalions, divisions, and corps. It’s basically tactical units. Our share of the National Foreign Intelligence Program is only 3 percent. We have a few units doing work in the national arena. We’ve been structured and are supporting basically a tactical environment and that’s going to change.

I just briefed General Shultz, Director of Army National Guard, and the Deputy, Brigadier General Vaughn, on restructuring the Army Guard to support national intelligence organizations down to the unit level. We are going to restructure the Army National Guard; when I say restructure that’s basically reflective of what Secretary Rumsfeld said: “No more force increase out there.” What we are going to do is to take, for example, our infantry units, armor and those types of units and convert them into MI spaces. “Break some china” as they like to say, and doing some things that will be pre-revolutionary. I won’t get promoted, but someone else will.

Intelligence agencies are looking for units at DIA, CIA, NSA, National Imagery and Mapping Agency; all those agencies. We are going to put billets in there if we see a value-added in supporting these agencies. We’ve already talked about that; we’re going to be supporting the Northern Command in that arena. Here’s what we are going to be doing: We are going to be putting some soldiers into Joint Terrorism Task Forces, JTTFs, because there is no better place to have that link in the regional areas of the nation than to provide intelligence support to the JTTFs out there. Clearly in some of the states the general trend in state headquarters is that of the Adjutant General. The senior military commander in each state is called the Adjutant General. He is the direct representative to the Governor who is our commander at the state level. The Governor is our Commander in Chief, but these Adjutants General typically turn to their military organizations for intelligence information. They provide intelligence to the Adjutant General, who sits on executive committees, and to the Governor on Homeland Defense. So we are going to have a link there to beef up state headquarters so they can get intelligence to the state governors.

Getting down to supporting OSIS (open-source information system) and the Worldwide Basic Information Library: We will be assigning more people to Ft. Leavenworth and the JRICs and getting those people out there. As I mentioned about intelligence restructuring, we’re going to go to national, theater, regional, state and unit levels — restructuring from top to bottom. We have approximately 6,300 soldiers now in the force structure and will add as many as three to five thousand more spaces possibly from infantry, armor and those types of units. For those of you who do not yet know it, we in the National Guard are Title 32 and most of you are Title 10. In Title 32 we weigh a lot more things, primarily
operations. We are now under the Posse Comitatus law and Title 32 status. In fact, the governor of any state can call us to active duty very quickly. Speaking about mobilization problems: The governor doesn’t have any problem; he just says, “Adjutant General bring me on whatever I need”—it’s that quick. The next morning after the 9/11 attacks at the Pentagon, there were Maryland National Guard MPs guarding the Pentagon. That really happened.

There will be a training burden for us and for a lot of the units because the issues are wartime mission and Homeland Defense. How are we going to deal with that? A lot of units in the reserves don’t have enough time to do all the things they have to do now. Now add one more thing to the burden—training in Homeland Defense. Development for leaders will have to start getting smart and learn how to deal with various states and regions. How do you deal with governors, how do you deal with a Joint Terrorism Task Force, how do you deal with the FBI? Those developments are what leaders have to start worrying about when we start doing Homeland Defense. In terms of the Army organization itself, we’ve got to see what the Army’s going to do for Homeland Defense. The Guard is certainly a link as I go around the community and around the nation and everybody says “Ed, we need National Guard support?” The challenge is that the structure we have in place right now does not support it. If you are looking for support to your organization, let me know and we will try to incorporate it into our plans. The end strength we already said is not going to go up so we’re going to have to change what we have right now to convert over. It will be a pain for some of our Adjutants General because they like their infantry. Other Adjutants General are looking forward to changing some of their force structure over to MI as they see the value-added not only for Homeland Defense but because they see the value-added from the standpoint of providing for the overall situation requirements for their area.

Finally, for the personnel issues you hear people talking about, we’ve got people coming soon to the end of their second year. My company lost about two dozen people for two years from our corporation. That’s two years away from friends, family and the workplace. We want to establish something in the future as to how to deal with these issues; how to handle not only the soldier issues but the family support issues. The key to whatever we do lies in the Reserve Policy Board, which will have to address those issues.

Quick and dirty: the National Guard is going to be there from the unit level through to the national level and we’re going to be there to support.
BIOGRAPHY

Colonel Edward A. Leacock, ARNG
Senior Intelligence Officer, Army National Guard

Colonel Edward Leacock graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science from the University of New York and a Master’s degree in General Administration from the University of Maryland. He received his commission from Officer Candidate School at Ft. Benning, Georgia in 1978. His military education includes the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Basic and Strategic Signals Intelligence / Electronic Warfare Officer Courses, the U.S. Army Airborne Course, the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Senior Cryptologic Reserve Officer Course, and the U.S. Army War College.

Colonel Leacock has commanded the 629th MI Battalion (Maryland Army National Guard) and commanded Alpha Company, U.S. Army Field Station Berlin, Germany (Active Duty). Other key assignments include Collection Staff Officer, Systems Analyst, Mission Control Officer, Training Officer, and Company Commander, U.S. Army Field Station Berlin, Germany (Active Duty); Cryptologic Staff Officer, 704th MI Brigade, Fort Meade, Maryland (Army Reserve-IMA); SIGINT/EW Operations Officer, Field Station San Antonio, Texas (Army Reserve-IMA); Intelligence Officer, 29th Rear Area Operations Center, Woodstock, Maryland (Maryland Army National Guard); 629th MI Battalion S-2 — with duty in Operation DESERT SHIELD with 18th Airborne Corps TENCAP Operations (Active Duty for Training); 629th MI Battalion S-3; and 629th MI Battalion Commander, Laurel, Maryland — with duty in Operation JOINT FORGE (SFOR7) with the 49th Armored Division (Federal Mobilization /Active Duty) (Maryland Army National Guard). Before assuming his current position in June 2001, he was the Battalion Commander, 629th MI Battalion, Laurel, Maryland (Maryland Army National Guard) from September 1993 to May 2001. He received his current rank in June 2001.

Colonel Leacock’s personal awards and decorations include the Meritorious Service Medal (2 OLC), the Army Commendation Medal (1 OLC), the Army Achievement Medal, the Army Good Conduct Medal (2nd Award), the Army Reserve Components Achievement Medal (4 OLC), the Non-Commissioned Officer Professional Development Ribbon (2” Device), the Maryland Distinguished Service Cross, the Maryland Meritorious Service Medal, Maryland Service Medal (10-Year Device), and the Parachutist Badge. He also was awarded the Colonel Carl F. Eifler Award from the National Military Intelligence Association.
Over the last couple of years, I was assigned at Ft. Meade with the National Security Agency. I was asked to help acquire Reserve support for the information technology challenges that Ft. Meade was to take on. Working with the OSD Joint Reserve Virtual Information Operations staffs, we were establishing a program of information technology experts from Reserves and Guard resources to build a unit that would support the Fort Meade missions. One of the discoveries in working this effort was that information technology is a new challenge — in spite of years of experience most of us are basically immigrants to the shores of information technology — the natives are your children. That’s the challenge we have right now; to come to terms with this thing called IT.

How could we groom a force of experts that can take on the issues of tracking, developing, and in turn providing an opportunity to give a reservist an opportunity to be part of a new trend in developing our nation? One colleague mentioned the legacy of the Civil Air Patrol. If you look at the history of CAP, it came alive on 1 December 1941. CAP helped introduce aeronautics to the nation and it is still in existence today. One of the thoughts applicable in developing opportunities through IT would be to use a CAP model for employing the IT strengths resident in the nation. In doing so, this would establish a body of experts through an auxiliary framework to increase the defense of the homeland through the cyber world.

Looking at the realities that we are talking about in terms of information technology, progress in information technology grows exponentially — represented by Moore’s law — every 18 months the production capability of the computer doubles. That trend is still going on despite the current problems with the economy. In turn, when you think of where we are heading as a society, you see that we are progressing. Looking at culture, culture is in arithmetic evolution — we would like to think of it as progression. What you are going to see is that IT growth will vastly outpace culture — we have to find a way to ride that IT wave. An opportunity like a Civil Cyber Force has seen its time come.

What is the solution when looking at cyber security? — the word is “auxiliary.” A Civil Cyber Force is an auxiliary. We are going to try to provide opportunities for those interested in information technology to be groomed with fundamentals of being a good cyber citizen. Should you participate in a Civil Cyber Force auxiliary, the benefits are that you can share your experiences with the cyber natives, the youth, who really don’t have role models to the extent we would like them to have. For example, hackers — the type who stay behind their terminals for days on end without getting involved in socially redeeming environments, become displaced by good role models offered by you, in the Reserve and Guard.

Core values characterize the service ethic held by you Reservists and Guard, working through various infrastructures that make our nation so strong. It’s interesting to note that...
President Bush did pay recognition to the Coast Guard Auxiliary a few months ago and he enjoyed talking about the 92-year old gentlemen who is still part of the auxiliary. I see that evolution with a Civil Cyber Force.

In December 2000 a meeting on the Civil Cyber Force was held at Colorado Springs. At the time, the U.S. Space Command was the newly assigned command for information operations. It was appropriate to get seniors from across the Reserves and industry to come and talk together; a collegial body to come up with strategy to look at the evolution of Civil Cyber Force. At this initial meeting a lot of time was spent discussing the name Civil Cyber Force. A colleague from Intel Corporation said it’s too bellicose; we couldn’t afford to have the nation’s youth be introduced to such a strong term. After 9/11, his attitude changed and he suggested the name should be changed to civil cyber killers.

So how do we see Civil Cyber Force in the current transformation? We’re going to be seeing more opportunities in IT. A Civil Cyber Force would be ideal to help groom the nation’s reserve forces through the auxiliary infrastructure. This could evolve into a cornerstone for defense. Using reservists nationwide would help serve various auxiliary opportunities that would be generated through a Civil Cyber Force. The auxiliary could be a lucrative recruitment tool — determining early on who the budding geniuses in IT are. In turn they could be allowed opportunities through the Reserves or Guard.

Another consideration for the Civil Cyber Force concerns mobilizing resources. At the present time, the Iraqi conflict demonstrates the need. Developing timely access to a ready-made source of expertise that can be accessed in times of crisis or conflict would be important, especially in an IT environment.

To date, everybody likes Civil Cyber Force as a concept — it’s like motherhood and apple pie. No one denies that there is value there. The idea of a Civil Cyber Force is germinating in a lot of people’s minds. Maybe with the increase of benefits and with an improving economy we might be able to see more emphasis on this opportunity in the corporate sector.

There is opportunity, when you look at the frontiers of IT. Think of this perspective: in about eight years, the nation’s leading computer scientists estimate they will be able to replicate human life with the computer. We need to be cautious of that exponential leading edge, which is going to be creating opportunities for a new defense, as well as create unique challenges for the society that we live in.
In conclusion, consider what Homeland Defense is evolving toward. Ensure that you don’t dismiss opportunities coming to you in the Reserves. Remember that there are ways to improve the nation’s defense through the cyber medium. Thank you very much.

BIOGRAPHY

Colonel Terrence J. Finnegan, USAFR
National Security Agency
and Faculty Member, Joint Military Intelligence College

Colonel Terry Finnegan is an Air Force Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentee assigned to the National Security Agency. He also serves as Course Director of the Intelligence and Information Operations course for the Postgraduate Intelligence Program for Reserves and the Monthly Executive Format Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence Degree Program on the faculty of the Joint Military Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC.

Commissioned in 1974 after graduation from Colorado State University, Colonel Finnegan began his active-duty career as a Weapons Controller with assignments at Hancock Field, New York, and Pyongang San, South Korea. He subsequently became an Imagery Intelligence Officer, posted to the 1st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, RAF Alconbury, United Kingdom, and with the 497th Reconnaissance Technical Group, Schierstein, Germany. In that role, he served as a Theater Briefing Officer and provided in-depth intelligence assessments on the Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat facing the NATO Alliance.

After leaving active duty, Colonel Finnegan became a civilian employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, where he established the agency’s NATO Intelligence Support Program, providing in-depth intelligence research for the alliance on critical issues such as the Soviet/Warsaw Pact Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile deployments. As a Reservist, he was assigned with the operational planning staff at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium, where he was instrumental in providing in-depth intelligence support to nuclear planning for the alliance. After taking a civilian position with the Air Force Space Command in Colorado Springs in 1989, Colorado, he was mobilized for Operation DESERT STORM, serving at Headquarters Central Command (Forward) as the liaison to public affairs, providing public domain information for the headquarters and also supporting the speech-writing team for the command’s nightly worldwide broadcast. In 1993, he was assigned to the Air Force Space Warfare Center, providing support to emerging technologies impacting space support to the warfighter, and serving as a seminal member of the Air Force Space Support Team, assigned to the Pacific Theater. In 1995, he was assigned as senior Air Force Reserve member supporting the Joint Intelligence Center-Pacific, where he established the first overall USAF Reserve architecture to support the theater’s primary intelligence operation.
In 1998, after he graduated from the Air War College in-resident program as an Air Force civilian employee, Colonel Finnegan’s Reserve assignment was changed to the National Security Agency. He was appointed Field Director and established the USAF Reserve architecture for Reserve support outside of the Ft. Meade region. He also established the Reserve architecture for the newly created Information Operations Technology Center and served as the Reserve Commander. At the conclusion of that tour in 2002, he was co-assigned with the Joint Military Intelligence College, where he serves on the faculty of the Postgraduate Intelligence Program for Reserves.
CLOSING REMARKS

Dr. Ronald D. Garst
Provost, JMIC

For the last decade, I have worked with reservists in the College, but I must say I've learned more today than I have in the last ten years. I want to thank all of you for your participation. I would like to make several comments about what I have learned.

Some things really struck me as important and interesting as well. One of them is the opportunity provided by the concept of the JRIC (Joint Regional Intelligence Center) and what this means in terms of the connectivity, the ability to bring people into the reserves and into active duty even for a few hours a day. You were talking about your workstation in your bedroom. What a revolutionary concept! We don't have to rip people out of their civilian life and move them a thousand miles away to get them involved, so I see that as a wonderful opportunity for the future. And, I think that as technology advances and as a new generation comes into being, it will be an ever-more-powerful concept.

The second part that struck me was the discussion today about flexibility in moving people back and forth from active duty, to full-time, to part-time, and so on. The complexity of it is a serious management problem. In the College we have a very good example of that complexity. Ten years ago we hired John Rowland because we simply didn't know what to do. He was the only guy that knew all of the issues and the ins and outs. So that is just a testimony to how complex it was and what we had to do to solve that problem. I am glad to see a number of speakers identify and discuss the problem that reservists have in balancing reserve duties, civilian careers and family life. I salute you for doing that. It's tough. It's really a very difficult problem and I commend you for your dedication.

Lastly, two more points on the integration of National Security and Homeland Security and Defense issues. You have several issues here, one of which is simply the legality of it; what we can do and what we cannot do. In the intelligence world, the law is a major issue. We have to watch that all the time. One of the other ironies of this really goes back to the question, “Why are you doing what you were doing?” The answer often involves the kind of person you are. Ironically, many reservists are also emergency first responders — medical technicians, firefighters, policemen — so we are robbing Peter to pay Paul. The difficulty arises because one cannot do two jobs at the same time.

Finally, as an analyst, I couldn’t resist the issue of the analysis going on, and as Admiral Manzelmann mentioned “the learning by doing” and the intelligence being produced by reservists. As you were talking, I started thinking about the relationship between DIA and all the Washington-based intelligence organizations as well as the JICs and the JAC. Soon the Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers will simply be nodes on the network. People won’t even pay attention to where you are. I think it will evolve into that. The analysis, of course, will become more sophisticated and complex. Collection, analysis, and operations have to be more fully integrated. So everybody in this business is
getting into a new realm and all of us will have to change.

Having said that, let me thank the people who made this conference possible. It is just like the credits at the end of the movie, when you are amazed at how many people are involved. John Rowland was our overall coordinator, but he was assisted by a lot of good folks and I will try to go through these names quickly—Colonel Tim Christensen, Deputy Coordinator; Colonel Ed Anthony, Assistant Coordinator; and Lieutenant Commander Barry Zulauf, Assistant Coordinator. Other people as well were involved in this, and I won’t try to tell what they did. They include: LTC Chris Chatfield, Col Ron DelGizzie, Col Terry Finnegan, CAPT Steve Maffeo, Corporal Greg Smith, COL Mark Jensen, CDR Becky Lewis (Master of Ceremonies), and a number of the faculty and staff members of the college—SK1 Bob Brearley, Thelma Flamer, Dotty Blackwell, Sgt Don Gordon, CDR Larry Hiponia, MAJ Phil Oakley, Wayne Perkins, John Robinson, Capt Clint Ross, Kathy Scala, Jess Steinruck, Russ Swenson, Vincent Tranchitella, Eileen Vidrine, and Jan Williams. All of these folks were involved in making today’s events possible.
TRANSFORMING RESERVE COMPONENT INTELLIGENCE

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